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Abstract 
Testamentary Competence: Defining Functional Abilities 
Christina M. Finello 
Kirk Heilbrun, Ph.D. 
 
 
Functional legal capacities are an essential part of any legal competency.  In the area of 
testamentary competence, however, there has been almost no research focusing on such 
capacities.  This study examines empirically the functional capacities associated with 
testamentary competence.  A total of 332 doctoral-level psychologists selected for their 
experience in forensic psychology or aging were administered a vignette describing a 
woman who wants to make a will.  The vignette systematically manipulated the variables 
(a) knowing that the will transfers property, (b) knowing important assets owned, (c) able 
to name heirs and detail relationship, and (d) able to explain a non-delusional rationale.  
Participants answered additional questions regarding relevant variables associated with 
testamentary competence.  Results provided support for the hypothesis that the testator’s 
knowledge of transfer, important assets, ability to name heirs and relationship, and ability 
to express a non-delusional rationale positively related to a finding of testamentary 
competence.  Further, a number of additional factors were indentified that could be useful 
in future research.  
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Introduction 
 Increasing numbers of individuals are living well past the age of 65 (Bureau of the 
Census, 2000).  The individuals who were born following World War II will represent a 
large percentage of the older population; in 2011, this generation will begin to turn 65, 
and there will be a rapid growth in number of aging individuals (Bureau of Census, 
2000).  As the average life span increases, more people are likely to suffer from 
dementing illnesses or other medical age-related conditions that might adversely affect 
their capacity to make a will (Redmond, 1987).  This may be associated with an increased 
need for forensic evaluation and testimony in cases where parties contest wills on the 
basis of lack of testamentary competence (Spar & Garb, 1992).  Legally, a person can 
make a will once s/he reaches age 18; in practice, creating a will is frequently deferred 
until later in life (Haldipur & Ward, 1996). 
 Testamentary competence is a legal issue that often requires the expertise, 
assessment skills, and testimony of mental health professionals.  Various researchers 
have discussed the functional capacities required for different decisional competencies, 
including competence to consent to treatment (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998), elderly 
persons’ competence to make personal care and financial decisions (Anderer, 1997), 
competence to consent to clinical research (Appelbaum & Grisso, 2001), and capacities 
to waive Miranda rights (Grisso, 1998).  However, to date, there has been little empirical 
research regarding the functional capacities associated with competence to make a will.  
The present study will use a twofold strategy (Douglas et al., 2003) that involves 1) 
reviewing the legal and psychological literature to obtain functional abilities potentially 
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relevant to the domain of testamentary competence, followed by 2) surveying 
professionals whose opinion is relevant to the issue of testamentary competence. 
Legal Competence 
 Competence is a legal construct (Berg, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1996).  Specific 
competencies are defined in relation to particular domains or functions (e.g., consent to 
treatment, execute a will, or stand trial).  In forensic contexts, competence generally 
pertains to decision making and communicating capacity (Spar, 2000).  The decision of 
whether someone is competent in a particular domain is decided by the legal decision-
maker, using the legal criteria associated with this domain.  Although courts are generally 
guided by the statutes drafted by legislatures, the specific criteria for a given competence 
may include scientific or technical aspects that are beyond the training of most judges.  In 
these instances, courts can use medical or mental health professionals to help inform their 
decisions.   
 Issues of competence arise in both criminal and civil contexts.  Legal 
competencies span many different areas of law.  Grisso (2003) suggests that all legal 
competencies share basic concepts.  First, all legal competencies appreciate the autonomy 
of individuals.  Second, they account for the fact that not all individuals possess the 
ability to make decisions on their own.  Third, the legal system uses these legal 
competencies as a model to make determinations as to who is incapacitated.  Finally, if 
the court finds a person legally incompetent, the government can step in and exert its 
influence over the usually autonomous individual because it is in “the best interest of the 
individual and the society” (Grisso, 2003, p. 2).   
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Defining competence 
Competence is specific to a particular legal standard, so while an individual may 
be competent to carry out one type of legal decision, it does not necessarily mean that 
s/he will be competent in another area.  There are many specific competencies that are 
outlined in statutes in different areas of the law.  For example, there are statutes that 
describe the standards for competence to consent to hospitalization, to consent to medical 
treatment, to marry, and to make a will (Sprehe, 2003).  Statutes that pertain to 
competencies tend to use language such as “capacity to know and understand” or “ability 
to know and understand” (Spar, 2000).  While there have been other conceptualizations 
of competence, there appears to be a consensus among researchers as to the common 
components that are encompassed in competence standards in the law.  This widely 
accepted definition characterizes competence to include understanding information, 
appreciating the significance of that information, the ability to use the information in a 
rational manner, and the ability to clearly communicate a preference (Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 1995; Dunn, Nowrangi, Palmer, Jeste, & Saks, 2006; Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress, 
Monahan, Feucht-Haviar, & Eisenberg, 1997; Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, 1977; Saks & 
Behnke, 1999).  The following sections will discuss each of these components.    
Ability to understand information.  The individual’s ability to understand the 
information presented is the most common ability that appears in legal competence 
standards (Berg et al., 1996).  This standard refers to the individual’s “comprehension of 
the information related to the issue at hand” (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995).  This type of 
information would involve a factual understanding of the issues.  The issues could 
include the nature and purpose of the decision, the risks and benefits of that decision, the 
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possible alternatives to that decision, and the associated risks and benefits to the 
alternative (Sprehe, 2003).  In the criminal context, a defendant would need to understand 
the risks and benefits of having a jury trial versus a bench trial.  Similarly, in the civil 
arena, an individual should understand the risk associated with a particular treatment 
procedure.  The individual need only understand the “concepts involved” rather than the 
“situation as a whole” (Berg et al., p. 354).  In this respect, understanding is a narrower 
concept than appreciation, which would involve the interrelating of the concepts with the 
situation at hand.  This distinction is discussed further in the following section.  Often, 
the legal system uses both but fails to define either, as evidenced by language found in 
statutes.  As a result, legislative language such as “understand the nature and 
consequences” is interpreted as including both understanding and appreciating (Berg et 
al., 1996).     
Appreciating the significance of information.  One distinction between 
“understanding” and “appreciating” has been made in the following way:  while 
understanding involves comprehending the issues involved a decision, appreciation 
encompasses the individual’s ability to apply the facts to the situation (Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998).  One would know the possible consequences of each alternative and 
be able to associate this consequence with the immediate situation.  Further, it is 
important that that a person apply the information in a rational manner to his or her own 
situation (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995).  In the criminal context, a defendant could be 
found incompetent if he does not accept a plea bargain because he believes that since he 
is a prophet he will not serve jail time (Roesch, Hart, & Zapf, 1996).  Similarly, in a civil 
case, a person could be considered incompetent if s/he decides not to consent to a 
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procedure because s/he believes that a hematoma is merely a discoloration of skin rather 
than evidence of an internal injury.  Simply the presence of delusion does not make a 
person incompetent, nor does an unusual belief.  However, when the delusion interferes 
directly with decision making ability of the presented problem, the likelihood of 
incompetence rises considerably (Berg et al., 1996).   
Ability to use information rationally.  For this component, a person should be able 
to provide a logical reason for the choice.  An individual must be able to weigh the risks 
and benefits of each alternative and make “a reasoned choice among decision 
alternatives” (Roesch et al., 1996, p. 103).  The actual outcome is not the important 
factor, but rather the person’s decision making capacities.  The choice must be supported 
by reality and not based on delusions or illogical thoughts (Roesch et al., 1996).  The 
legal system considers whether the person followed a rational process of thinking; 
whether the ultimate decision is conventional should be irrelevant, as personal values 
come into play with decision making (Sprehe, 2003).     
Ability to clearly communicate a preference.  The ability to communicate a choice 
is two pronged; this component requires a person to come to a decision and impart that 
decision to others.  An individual’s choice should be stable and sufficiently unwavering 
so that the decision can be implemented by the representative (Sprehe, 2003).  If a person 
cannot make up his or her mind, it would be impossible to execute the decision.  Further, 
once an individual makes a decision, s/he has to be able to communicate that decision to 
the appropriate representative (e.g., an attorney, treating physician, or forensic evaluator).  
Many courts use this component as the “threshold determination of competence” (Berg et 
al., 1996, p. 352).  Thus, a person who cannot communicate a decision, such as person in 
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a coma, would be treated as per se incompetent.  Since the inability to communicate leads 
to a finding of per se incompetence, mental illness can be a contributing factor to this 
component.  A person who cannot convey a decision because of mental illness would be 
considered incompetent (Roesch et al., 1996).   
Assessment of competence    
As noted in the previous section, the legal system determines whether an 
individual’s capabilities meet a minimum threshold for a finding of competence.  While 
the legal system makes and interprets the laws dealing with various legal competencies, 
the legal decision-maker can usefully be informed by medical and behavioral science 
regarding the presence of relevant capacities in a given case.  Mental health professionals 
perform competency assessments to inform the court on a particular legal decision.  
While there are many different legal competencies, Grisso (2003) posited a model of 
components that define all legal competencies.  This model presents a structure “to guide 
assessments toward objectives that are consistent with legal criteria and process in 
competence cases” (Grisso, 2003, p. 23).  He cautions that not all components will fit 
every legal competence; however, the model serves as a structure to conceptualize 
assessments of competence.  The five components are: 1) Functional, 2) Causal, 3) 
Interactive, 4) Judgmental, and 5) Dispositional (Grisso, 2003).1    
Functional.  The functional component contemplates what an individual “knows, 
understands, believes, or can do that is directly related to the competence construct” 
                                                 
1 The discussion only includes five components instead of six components that make up all legal 
competencies.  In the 2003 version of Evaluating Competencies, Grisso acknowledges that the original 
model in the 1986 first edition of the book had six components. He notes that he changed the new model to 
include five components because he feels that the contextual component can be folded into the functional 
component without losing meaning.  He states that the elimination of a component enhances simplicity. 
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(Grisso, 2003, p. 25).  It focuses on observable behaviors related to the legal competence 
at issue, with the specific functional abilities differing for each legal competence (Moye, 
2004).  This component acknowledges that mental and physical health diagnoses, while 
relevant, are not enough for a finding of incapacity.  The focus is on both actual 
functioning and the hypothetical consequences of particular conditions (Grisso, 2003).  A 
person may have a mental health diagnosis, but it may not be the only thing affecting the 
functional ability needed for the competence in question.  Thus, while a diagnosis is 
necessary, it would not be sufficient in that case. 
Since legal competencies differ, it would follow (under the Grisso model) that the 
functional abilities associated with each legal competency also differ.  Specific functional 
abilities for each legal competence can be gauged in different ways.  First, scientific 
theory can guide whether a particular ability is relevant to a legal competence (Grisso, 
2003).  Second, empirical studies of the particular abilities can reveal their relationship to 
the larger competence (using, for example, a “known groups” design and comparing 
individuals who are adjudicated as competent and incompetent for each kind of legal 
competency).  Third, case law opinions can lead researchers to investigate what 
functional abilities comprise a particular competence.  Ideally each method would yield 
similar functional abilities and show a considerable degree of overlap.  When theory, 
empirical study, and law give conflicting notions of the functional abilities constituting a 
particular competence, it can be hard for the evaluator to decide what abilities are most 
important in an assessment.  Grisso (2003) suggested that all three have utility, as each 
“provides a somewhat different perspective on the abilities of greatest relevance to legal 
questions within the defined context” (p. 28).     
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Causal.  The causal component implicates the diagnosis or underlying mental or 
physical health condition, such as dementia, Alzheimer’s Disease, or Bipolar Disorder 
(Moye, 2004).  Diagnosis is usually determined by medical records, patient history, and 
current clinical presentation.  Statutes contain phrases that reference this causal 
component.  Often, law will contain the words “because of” or “as a result of” followed 
by a mental or physical impairment (Grisso, 2003, p. 29).  The causal component is 
important to the legal system so the system is not misused.  For example, faking 
symptoms of incompetence can be beneficial for a defendant wishing to delay the 
disposition of charges.  Also, the legal system strongly supports individual autonomy, 
and the court will want to know specifically why it is interfering with the individual’s 
liberty interests (Grisso, 2003).  
Interactive. The interactive component focuses on the interaction of the person in 
a specific situation relevant to the legal competence.  The demands of specific 
circumstances are of paramount importance.  This component accounts for the particular 
“personal, physical, psychosocial, and situational demands” present (Moye, 2004, p. 4).  
The focus is also on the individual’s resources.  For example, the demands on an 
individual are much different for someone who has relatively few financial resources, as 
contrasted with someone who has a large, complex estate (Moye, 2004).  The individual’s 
functional abilities must be considered within the context of his or her environment.  
Grisso (2003) stated that when the legal system makes a finding of incompetence, the 
court is really concluding that there is a “person-context incongruity or mismatch” (p. 
33).    
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Judgmental and dispositional.  Legal competencies need a judgment that the 
person-environment “incongruence warrants a finding of legal incompetence” (Grisso, 
2003, p. 36).  Analyzing the interaction of the person and the demands of the situation in 
a particular case leads to a judgment of the amount of incongruence necessary to find a 
person incompetent.  Statutory language includes terms such as “sufficient,” 
“significant,” and “reasonable degree” which indicates to the court how much 
incongruency is necessary for a finding of incompetence (Grisso, 2003, p. 36).  Further, 
once a court renders judgment, there is a dispositional response.  The response is tailored 
to the particular legal competence.       
Defining Legally Relevant Functional Abilities  
In order to gauge whether someone is competent, a mental health professional 
must assess the functional abilities relevant to the particular legal competence (Grisso, 
2003).  Forensic assessment instruments can provide a model upon which to 
conceptualize a legal competence.  There are forensic assessment instruments for many 
legal competencies.  The better forensic assessment instruments were developed in a 
process that involves a number of steps:  identification of the legal question and the 
relevant forensic capacities, operationalization of the variables to be measured (including 
the forensic capacities), piloting of the instrument to obtain information on its practicality 
and psychometric properties, full derivation study to clarify information obtained during 
the piloting step, cross-validation to provide independent information on the instrument, 
and the development of a manual describing the steps taken, research conducted, and 
addressing questions of administration and interpretation (Heilbrun, Rogers, & Otto, 
2002).  
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The process of developing a forensic assessment instrument for a legal 
competence involves taking these steps.  The present study will focus, in part, on defining 
the legally relevant functional abilities or psycholegal capacities (Grisso, 2003) in the 
area of testamentary competence.  These functional legal capacities must be related to the 
legal competence in question, and also related to theory and empirical knowledge in 
medical and behavioral science.   
The initial domain of potential capacities can be described by examining relevant 
law and science.  Psycholegal researchers at this stage can review case law and statutes to 
find words and phrases that yield a global sense of the abilities required for the 
competence (Grisso, 2003).  It is comparably important for the psycholegal researcher to 
examine theory and empirical studies related to the competence in question.  While this 
approach of examining legal and scientific literature is apt to ensure contemplation of 
factors relevant to a particular psycholegal capacity, the approach “requires considerable 
judgment and discretion on the part of the professional who reviews the literature” 
(Douglas, Otto, & Borum, 2003, p. 192).   
One approach to gathering relevant data regarding psycholegal capacities involves 
obtaining the views of experts with knowledge of the particular competency.  Usually this 
approach uses survey techniques, and elicits “information regarding how persons in the 
field conceptualize a particular issue” (Douglas et al., 2003, p. 192).  This approach 
requires careful consideration of the sample population to be surveyed.  The sample 
chosen must be representative of the population and their opinions.  The opinions of 
unrepresentative samples may have little utility, as a concept list generated by those 
individuals may be vastly different from the current law (Douglas et al., 2003).  Further, 
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in order to develop an empirically sound forensic assessment instrument, it is necessary 
to include groups of experts from both the psychological and legal disciplines.  This is a 
multi-step process that involves surveying mental health professionals, legal 
professionals, or a combination of both (Douglas et al., 2003).  For this initial study and 
as a first step in empirically defining the functional abilities necessary for competence to 
make a will, I chose to only include psychologists since they would likely be more 
familiar with the functional abilities necessary to make a will.  Once the results from the 
current study are complete, it will be necessary to include legal professionals in the next 
step.  Future studies can include legal professionals, such as trust and estate lawyers and 
probate judges, to ascertain whether the functional abilities found in this study correlate 
to their ideas and legal system’s conception of competence to make will.     
Defining Testamentary Competence 
Evolution of Law 
 Wills can be contested on one of the following grounds: 1) the will was 
improperly executed; 2) the will was fraudulent; 3) the testator was vulnerable to undue 
influence; and 4) the testator lacked capacity at the time the will was executed, also 
known as lack of testamentary competence (Haldipur & Ward, 1996).  This dissertation 
study will focus on the fourth ground.  
 American legal conceptualization of testamentary capacity has its roots in English 
law.  In England, the first case to attempt a legal test for testamentary capacity was 
Pawlet, Marquess of Winchester’s Case (1601).  Lord Coke set out the test for 
determining whether someone was of “sane and disposing memory” (p. 287).  In his 
analysis, it was not enough that the testator possess memory, but that he has “disposing 
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memory …a sane and perfect memory,” which meant that the individual making the will 
understood the will’s disposition and the reason for the disposition (Pawlet, 1601, p. 287-
88).   
In 1790, Lord Kenyon in Greenwood v. Greenwood (1790) laid out the test that 
closely resembles American law.  John Greenwood’s brother, William, charged that John 
was of unsound mind when he executed his will.  Lord Kenyon gave the following 
instruction to the jury: “If he had a power of summoning up his mind so as to know what 
his property was, and who those persons were that then were the objects of his bounty, 
then he was competent to make a will” (Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1790, p. 943).  
Moreover, the testator needed only to have capacity at the time of the will, regardless of 
how “deranged he might be before” (Greenwood, 1790, p. 943).  Thus, after that case, the 
prevailing rule was the testator was competent if he knew what he owned and knew the 
persons who were the “objects of his bounty” (would receive the proceeds of the estate 
described in the will).   
An additional important English case (Harwood v. Baker, 1840) added the 
requirement that the testator must be able to form a rational plan for his disposition.  
Also, the Harwood Court wanted the testator to be capable of making a rational plan 
while simultaneously retaining information related to the extent of his or her property and 
the objects of his or her bounty (Harwood v. Baker, 1840).   
 The legal standard for testamentary capacity in the United States has been shaped 
by Greenwood v. Greenwood (1790) and Harwood v. Baker (1840) (Ross & Reed, 2006).  
In the first major American decision on testamentary competence, the court in Harrison 
v. Rowan (1820) followed the Greenwood test.  Later decided cases added to the 
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testamentary capacity jurisprudence in the oft-cited case of Delafield v. Parrish (1862) 
(Ross & Reed, 2006).  The judge in Delafield cited the rule of law from Harwood v. 
Baker and Harrison v. Rowan, and charged: 
“it is essential that the testator has sufficient capacity to comprehend perfectly the 
condition of his property, … the objects of his bounty… have sufficient active 
memory in his mind, without prompting, the particulars or elements of the business to 
be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive … 
their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in 
relation to them” (p. 29).   
 Once courts established the basis for the law of testamentary competence, this 
jurisprudence was enhanced with the creation of the insane delusion doctrine.  Maryland 
first described this doctrine in 1848 in Townshend v. Townshend.  Other states like New 
York and Pennsylvania soon followed (Ross & Reed, 2006).  The New York Court of 
Appeals case of American Seaman’s Friends Society v. Hopper (1865) held that a will 
created on the basis of an unfounded belief would not be executed on the basis of lack of 
testamentary capacity.  The court defined a delusion as a persistent belief in facts “which 
have no real existence except in [a] perverted imagination, and [are] against all evidence 
and probability” (Hopper, 1865, p. 624).  The court’s definition of delusion in Hopper is 
often cited by other jurisdictions in the United States even though a state case carries no 
authority outside its own jurisdiction. However, many courts found the definition to be 
persuasive (e.g. in Wyoming, Branson v. Roelofsz, 1937; in California, In re Hess’ 
Estate, 1920; in Maryland, Johnson v. Johnson, 1907; in Kentucky, Layer v. Layer, 1901; 
in Oregon, Potter v. Jones, 1891) . 
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Statutes 
 The Uniform Probate Code, a body of law about wills that many states have 
adopted, maintains that the testator must be of a “sound mind” at the time of will 
execution (§ 2-501 (2006)).  The Code does not provide much guidance as to what is 
meant by the phrase “sound mind.”  There is no national standard for testamentary 
competence; the standard is set by state statute.  Although the phrasing may vary slightly 
from state to state, a close examination reveals four key components that appear in the 
majority of statutes (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000).2  For example, in Kentucky, to be 
competent to execute a will, a testator must (1) know the natural objects of her bounty; 
(2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character and value of her estate; and (4) 
dispose of her estate according to her own fixed purpose (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 394.020).  
In Colorado, a person has testamentary capacity when (1) she understands the nature of 
her act; (2) she knows the extent of her property; (3) she understands the proposed 
testamentary disposition; (4) she knows the natural objects of her bounty; and (5) the will 
represents her wishes (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-12-407).  In Georgia, a testator 
possesses sufficient mental capacity to make a will if he (1) understood that a will had the 
effect of disposing of his property at the time of his death, (2) was capable of 
remembering generally what property was subject to disposition by the will and (3) 
remembering those persons related to him, and (4) was capable of expressing an 
intelligent scheme of disposition (Ga. Code Ann. § 53-4-12).   
                                                 
2 Only Connecticut has a materially different standard for testamentary competence.  In Connecticut’s 
statute, the standard for testamentary competence is the same as the standard for competence to contract, 
which is a much higher standard (Ross & Reed, 2006).  Connecticut’s standard for competence to contract 
requires that an individual understand the nature and effect of the business being transacted (Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 45a-250) (2006). 
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Accordingly, competence to make a will depends upon whether the testator 1) 
understands the nature of the will; 2) understands the nature and extent of his or her 
property; 3) knows the objects of one’s bounty; and 4) understands the plan for 
distribution of assets (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000).  Further, as noted earlier, a 
testator with an “insane delusion” will not be competent to make a will.  Finally, presence 
of mental disorder or disease is not by itself sufficient for a finding of incompetence 
(Redmond, 1987). 
Case Law 
 Since statutes dealing with testamentary competence often use vague language 
and do not provide a clear idea of what is expected of a competent testator, it can be 
useful to examine relevant case law.  When the courts have evaluated the elements of 
testamentary competence, the courts have not consistently laid out a particular order of 
examination (Boggess, 2005).  There is debate among legal scholars as to whether the 
testator must meet all the elements of the test in order to be deemed competent.  Marty-
Nelson and Gilmore (2000) suggest that the testator must meet every element of the test, 
although adding that the decision-making process is dependent on the facts of the case.  
The imprecise nature is most likely due to the interplay among each of the factors.  In 
some cases, knowing the nature and extent of the property is most important; in others, 
the plan of disposition must be weighed most heavily (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000).  
Depending on the circumstances and facts of the case, the importance of one factor may 
greatly outweigh the value attached to the others.  However, Boggess (2005) observed 
that the absence of one factor will not prove fatal to a finding of competence. 
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Some (e.g., Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000) have argued that judicial opinions in 
this area are particularly likely to be driven by the court’s preferred outcome.  Champine 
(2006) attributes this in particular to whether a particular court might consider testator 
autonomy or family protection more important.  For example, in litigation based on the 
lack of testamentary capacity which has an unusual disposition and leaves an estate to a 
charity instead of a next of kin, the court might consider the fairer result to be in favor of 
family.   Nonetheless, each factor has been discussed by legal scholars.  This will be 
addressed in subsequent sections.   
Understanding nature of the will.  Legal commentators suggest that courts want 
testators to know that the signed document disposes of his or her property.  A testator 
must also understand that his or her signature executes the document and gives effect to 
the will (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000).  In other words, the testator must know the 
legal significance of the document and have an intelligent understanding of the act of 
making a will (Wolfe, 1997).    
 Understanding the nature and extent of property. For this prong, a testator needs 
only a minimum knowledge of assets.  However, courts have varying requirements for 
the requisite level of knowledge.  A testator does not need to list all of his or her assets, 
nor know the exact value of his or her property.  Only a general appreciation of the value 
and extent of holdings is necessary (Wolfe, 1997).  Additionally, some courts (e.g., 
Brown v. Mitchell, 1889; In Re Estate of Schnell, 2004; Matter of Estate of Ioupe, 1994; 
Noland v. Noland, 1997; Pyle v. Sayers, 2000) hold that the capacity to remember is 
more important than whether the individual can actually report memory for the specific 
information.  There is disagreement as to whether the size of the estate is material to this 
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factor.  Although some courts say that is not (e.g., In re Estate of Romero, 2005; In re 
Freeman’s Will, 1925; Matheson v. Matheson, 1923), others have held that there is a 
proportional relationship between the extent of knowledge required and the size of the 
estate (e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 1889; Clifton v. Clifton, 1891; Drum v. Capps, 1909; 
In re Holmstrom’s Estate, 1940).3   
 Knowing the natural objects of one’s bounty.  The courts have held that natural 
objects are “persons related to the testator by ties of blood or affection” (Marty-Nelson & 
Gilmore, 2000).  These would be the individuals that would commonly take under a 
testator’s will.  Although the testator is not obligated by law to leave his property to his or 
her natural objects, s/he does need to know who they are and understand that they are the 
individuals who would naturally be expected to take under the will (e.g., Williams v. 
Vollman, 1987; In re Estate of Kuzma, 1979; Hamilton v. Morgan, 1927).  “Natural 
objects” are individuals related to the testator by blood or affection “who would naturally 
be thought of as a having a stake in the testator’s estate” (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 
2000).  An “unnatural disposition” would be one that excluded some or all family 
members from the will and left the property to someone who would appear to not have 
much meaning to the testator.  A testator who leaves a minimal amount of his estate to his 
three daughters, but leaves the remainder to his housekeeper, is an example of unnatural 
disposition (e.g., In re Colbeck’s Will, 1974).  Presence of an unnatural disposition, alone, 
does not invalidate a will.  This notion underscores the importance of testator autonomy, 
and the freedom to distribute property as desired (Boggess, 2005).  The level of detail 
required of the testator’s will varies from court to court.  However, courts (e.g., In re 
                                                 
3 The cases in this section and the next two sections are cited from various jurisdictions to provide 
examples of the assertions being made. 
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Estate of Kessler, 1999; In re Estate of Weeks, 1997) do not require actual knowledge or 
understanding, but merely the capacity to know or understand. 
 Understanding the plan for distribution of assets.  For this prong, a testator must 
have a clear plan regarding the disposition of the will (Marty-Nelson & Gilmore, 2000).  
Many courts have held that the testator must form a rational plan for the distribution of 
property (e.g., In re Estate of Roesler, 1997; In re Estate of Washburn, 1997; Landmark 
Trust Inc. v. Goodhue, 2001).  The extent to which the testator needs to understand the 
estate plan varies by state; however, many courts (e.g., Doolittle v. Upson, 1952; Estate 
of  Mann, 1986;  Henderson v. Henderson, 1997; In re Sanderson’s Estate, 1959; In re 
Teel’s Estate, 1971) have determined it takes less mental capacity to make a will than to 
conduct business or make a contract.  Other courts implicitly consider the complexity of 
estate (Wolfe, 1997).   
 Freedom from delusions. As noted earlier, an insane delusion is a “false fixed 
belief not founded on reason and incapable of being removed by reason, which emanates 
from within the individual and for which there is no evidence” (Kern, p. 336, 1987).   The 
insane delusion can be the product of mental or physical health disease or from the 
influence of prescribed medications or illicit substances, and must have a direct impact on 
the will by affecting one of the other four factors (Wolfe, 1997).  For example, if a 
testator’s delusion caused lack of knowledge regarding the extent property, the will 
would not be valid.  By contrast, a delusion affecting knowledge of issues irrelevant to 
the will would have little effect on the finding of competence (Wolfe, 1997).   
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Theory and Scholarship 
 To date, most of the scholarly discussion of testamentary competence has been 
based on theory.  Psycholegal scholars have examined the legal standards of testamentary 
competence and attempted to translate those standards into functional capacities.  For 
example, Marson, Huthwaite, and Hebert (2004) suggested that the testator must know 
that: 1) s/he will die; 2) a will is a written document; 3) the will transfers property to his 
or her heirs; and 4) the will takes effect after death.  The testator should be able to 
express his or her understanding verbally.  Regarding the knowledge of the nature and 
extent of one’s property, Marson et al. (2004) hypothesized that the testator knows 
important assets that s/he owns.  For example, s/he should know about real estate, 
financial holdings, bank accounts, and personal property, such as vehicles, and also be 
able to distinguish between family members and non-family members, such as friends 
and caretakers.  Marson and colleagues also observed that the testator should also 
understand that s/he is free to disinherit natural heirs.  Further, the testator should be able 
to name his or her heirs and detail the relationship.  Finally, for the prong of 
understanding the plan of distribution, Marson et al. (2004) theorized that the testator 
must be able to show his knowledge of the disposition plan.  Specifically, the testator 
must articulate some basic plan for distributing property to his or her heirs.  The testator 
should be able to articulate the consequences of the will, explain the rationale for specific 
bequests, and justify why certain individuals are excluded.  Further, s/he must know the 
identity of the will’s executor, who is the person appointed by testator to oversee the 
distribution of assets.  Marson et al. (2004) also pointed out that the will must not be the 
product of an insane delusion. 
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 Melton, Petrila, Poythress, and Slobogin (2007) proposed that the question of 
testamentary competence is “best conceptualized as a functional one” (p. 397).  They 
noted the types of questions that should be asked for each element of testamentary 
competence.  First, to assess whether a testator knows that a will is being made, they 
suggested that the evaluator ask if the testator knows what a will is, what it is intended to 
do, and why s/he is making a will at the particular time.  This last question might alert the 
evaluator to possible delusional thinking on the part of the testator.  Second, an evaluator 
should probe whether the testator’s information about his or her property is correct, in 
order to test whether a testator knows about the nature and extent of his property.  There 
should be questions about jobs, salary, living situation, and personal property.  Melton et 
al. commented that this information is important “to determine whether subjects’ 
assessments of their possessions are realistic or are instead wholly at odds with the facts” 
(2007, p. 398).  Questions aimed at discerning the testator’s actual values or preferences 
more accurately reflect his or her knowledge of the “natural objects of bounty,” making 
this standard preferable to the “reasonable person” standard because the latter may not be 
consistent with the testator’s values and preferences.  The testator might be making a 
disposition that many would find odd or unusual, or based on hostility towards one of his 
natural heirs.  So long as the disposition is not based on a delusion, the testator should be 
free to dispose of his or her property in any way that s/he chooses.  For this element, 
evaluators should ask questions that would have the testator identify family members, 
other people important in the testator’s life, and his or her relations with individuals in 
both groups (Melton et al., 2007).  For the final element, knowledge of a plan for 
distribution, Melton and colleagues recommended that the testator know about the 
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general consequences of the planned disposition, allowing the evaluator to discern 
whether there is delusional thinking involved in making this decision.  
The MacArthur Treatment Competence study can offer a theoretical model 
regarding the types of functional abilities that a researcher might want to assess in the 
area of testamentary competence (Grisso et al., 1995).  These investigators identified the 
four elements of competencies noted earlier:  communicating a preference, understanding 
information, appreciating the significance of that information, and using the information 
in a rational manner.  Many statutes on testamentary competence include these four 
elements. 4  In the MacArthur study, the first of these elements--communicating a 
preference--was operationalized as actually selecting a choice.  In the area of 
testamentary competence, a person would have to communicate his or her choice about 
how that person would distribute assets.   
The second element involves understanding relevant information.  Grisso and 
colleagues tested the comprehension of the nature of the treatment, the risks and benefits, 
and the alternatives.  For testamentary competence, a testator can be asked about the 
nature of the disposition, the probable benefits and risks of the disposition, and whether 
there are any better alternative dispositions.   
For the third element, a person must appreciate the significance of this 
information.  In the MacArthur study, individuals were asked about the benefits of the 
treatment generally for their condition, the benefits of a specific treatment, and the 
likelihood of improvement without treatment (Grisso et al., 1995).  The individuals also 
had to explain their reasoning, and were given a hypothetical situation which nullified 
                                                 
4 For examples of statutory language from various jurisdictions, see page 13.  
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those reasons.  In the same way, a person being evaluated for testamentary competence 
could be asked about the benefits of a will devise (a gift given by the will),5 the benefits 
of his or her specific devises, and the likely consequences of such a devise.  Further, the 
person would need to give reasons for the manner in which s/he gave away property in 
the will.  Finally, a person must be able to use the information in a rational manner.  
Grisso et al. (1995) tested the reasoning process of the individuals by having participants 
seek information, consider the consequences of various treatment alternatives, compare 
two treatment alternatives, weigh multiple treatment alternatives simultaneously, consider 
the risks and benefits, and apply personal preferences consistently.  Similarly, a testator 
should ask about information related to the disposition, consider the consequences of 
various will devises, compare two will devises, consider many possible will devises at 
one time, and consistently utilize personal preferences.   
 There is relatively little empirical research on the nature of testamentary 
competence (Marson et al., 2004).  The limited available empirical work will now be 
reviewed.  Baird Brown, an attorney, created the Legal Capacity Questionnaire (Walsh, 
Brown, Kaye, & Grigsby, 1994).  The Legal Capacity Questionnaire helps attorneys 
understand their clients’ testamentary competence prior to execution of the will.  The 
questionnaire focuses on three of the four elements of testamentary competence:  
understanding the nature and extent of property, knowing the objects of one’s bounty, 
and understanding the plan for distribution of assets (Walsh et al., 1994).  To assess 
whether the testator knows about the natural objects of one’s bounty, questions require 
                                                 
5 There was previously a distinction between a devise and a bequest in the case law.  While both are gifts, a 
devise is a gift of realty (real property, land) under a will, whereas a bequest is gift of personalty (personal 
property).  The Uniform Probate Code has eliminated this distinction, and now all gifts are called devises 
(Pennell & Newman, 2005). 
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the testator to know whether s/he is married, the spouse’s name, and names and addresses 
of children and siblings.  Further, to gauge whether the testator understands the nature 
and extent of his or her property, questions require the testator to know about kinds of 
property, kinds of financial transactions, and perform basic math.  Finally, to test 
understanding of the distribution plan, the testator is asked to differentiate between 
tangible and intangible objects (e.g., a car versus religious beliefs) and whether they can 
be distributed by a will (Walsh et al., 1994).   
Brown and his colleagues also collected empirical data on the instrument. They 
collected data to determine the properties of the Legal Capacity Questionnaire.  First, the 
group took a random sample of elderly individuals from three different living 
environments – community residences, retirement homes, and skilled nursing facilities.  
The sample totaled 65 people with 18 people from community residences, 19 from 
retirement homes, and 28 from skilled nursing facilities.  The individuals were 
administered the Legal Capacity Questionnaire.  Persons in the skilled nursing facilities 
scored the lowest on the Legal Capacity Questionnaire.  The group attributed this finding 
to the fact that many of the individuals in the skilled nursing facilities had advanced 
impairments.  People who lived in community residences scored the highest; however, 
the authors suggested that this sample may not generalize well to the general population 
(Walsh et al., 1994).  The age of the individuals interviewed ranged from 60-99.   
Next, the group compared the subject’s score on the Legal Capacity Questionnaire 
to other mental status and behavioral instruments.  Scores from the Legal Capacity 
Questionnaire showed a strong relation to the Mini-Mental Status Exam, a method to test 
the cognitive mental status of individuals.  Both measures have a maximum score of 30; 
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however, a score of 23 on the Mini-Mental Status Exam, indicating cognitive 
impairment, is equivalent to a score of 25 or 26 on the Legal Capacity Questionnaire, 
which indicates that a lawyer can be confident that a subject has capacity.  The Legal 
Capacity Questionnaire was also compared to the Behavioral Dyscontrol Scale, an 
instrument that has “demonstrated the ability to predict behavioral disorders associated 
with frontal lobe syndromes” (Walsh et al., 1994, p. 5).  The authors chose the Behavioral 
Dyscontrol Scale for comparison because the scale can be an indicator of an individual’s 
capacity to organize and carry out a plan.  The study showed a high correlation between 
the scores on the Legal Capacity Questionnaire and the Behavioral Dyscontrol Scale.  
Finally, the researchers established cut off scores for the Legal Capacity Questionnaire.  
The authors caution that the scores should be used as general guidelines to continue estate 
planning with a client.  Further, they suggest that lawyers should consider the living 
situation and age of the client with reference to the normative data (Walsh et al., 1994).  
There are 3 score ranges.  If an individual scores 24 or above, the High range, on the 
instrument, a lawyer would have confidence to proceed with estate planning, even though 
there may be mild impairments.  The impairments would not rise to the level of 
interference.  If an individual scores a 23, 22, or 21 (Borderline), then it is suggested that 
lawyer proceed with caution, investigate more thoroughly or consider seeking assistance 
from mental health evaluator.  Finally, if an individual scores less than 20, the Low 
range, the lawyer should proceed with “extreme caution” and contact a mental health 
professional (Walsh et al., 1994).       
Although the Legal Capacity Questionnaire is a significant step in the study of 
testamentary competence, it has several important limitations.  First, the questionnaire is 
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not based on an underlying conceptual model. Second, there are limited normative data 
available for older adults.  Third, the questionnaire does not address the issues of 
understanding a will or psychotic symptoms (Walsh et al., 1994).   
 Spar, Hankin, and Stodden (1995) surveyed probate judges’ views on procedural 
aspects and expert testimony in testamentary competence cases.  Judges were asked about 
mental capacity and the factors that influence it.  The investigators sent a questionnaire to 
300 probate judges in the National College of Probate Judges and 119 judges responded. 
Results showed that 52% of the judges viewed a testator merely recognizing his or her 
property from a list as sufficient for knowing the nature and extent of property.  Based on 
the results, the researchers also thought it would be desirable that there should be 
additional testing done if the testator did not spontaneously recall the information (Spar et 
al., 1995).  Additionally, while 56% of the judges felt that a finding of incompetence 
required the presence of mental illness, a substantial minority (24%) felt there was not a 
relationship between mental illness and incompetence.  The authors cited a limitation to 
their study and cautioned that the sample might not be random as the 119 judges only 
represented 20% of the membership in National College of Probate Judges.  Given the 
very limited availability of empirical studies on testamentary capacities, it is clear that we 
need more empirical research in this area.       
Practical Applications 
 The assessment of forensic issues may be either present-state (capacities as they 
exist at the time the assessment is conducted) or retrospective (focusing on capacities that 
existed at a designated time in the past).  Assessment of testamentary competence may be 
either.  It may be conducted around the time a will is being made (or changed), or it may 
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be done after the testator has died and the will is contested.  Indeed, testamentary 
competence most often becomes an issue when someone challenges the will (Redmond, 
1987).  An individual is presumed to be competent to make a will, and the person 
contesting the will has the burden of proving the testator’s incompetence.     
 Retrospective assessment of testamentary competence.  The most common 
circumstance for assessing competence to make a will is following the testator’s death 
(Regan & Gordon, 1997).  In a retrospective assessment, an evaluator reviews relevant 
records, including medical records, and conducts collateral interviews with family 
members, friends, caretakers, and any other individuals whose observations may be 
relevant.   In formulating his or her opinions about the testator’s competence, the 
evaluator will draw inferences about the individual’s mental state at the time of will’s 
execution (Bartol & Bartol, 2004).   Records can be helpful in this process, but may 
contain largely irrelevant or insufficient information.   
 Because of the inferred relationship between certain disorders and testamentary 
competence, a testator who had been diagnosed as having one or more such disorders 
may be susceptible to having his or her will overturned by a court.  It is certainly true that 
disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, and metabolic disorders, as well as 
severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, can impair an 
individual’s testamentary competence (Redmond, 1987).  Thus, a retrospective 
assessment of a testator who was diagnosed with such disorders can place the contestants 
of a will at an advantage.  It can be difficult for the evaluator to determine what effect, if 
any, the testator’s illness had on testamentary competence.  Detailed documentation and 
records can sometimes ameliorate this disadvantage when the information is presented 
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with enough specificity to provide the evaluator with a clearer picture of the illness’ 
impact on the testator (Redmond, 1987).   
 The four elements that make up testamentary competence can be particularly 
difficult to assess retrospectively.  In a retrospective inquiry, an evaluator will have great 
difficulty providing meaningful information regarding whether the testator understood 
the nature of the will.  Further, if the testator is dead, the existence of a will provides 
prima facie evidence that the testator possessed a basic understanding (Melton et al., 
2007).  Regarding the knowledge of nature and extent of property, a retrospective 
assessment is based on objective information contained in the will.  The evaluator will 
assess if the testator’s disposition matches his assets—whether the testator is giving away 
something that he has the power to bequeath.  Additionally, if some items of property are 
missing, the evaluator will not know from considering only the will whether the testator 
merely forgot the items or lacked the ability to recall the items.   
An inquiry into the testator’s knowledge about the objects of bounty is more 
complicated when the testator is dead.  Under this circumstance, the evaluator must 
“reconstruct the testator’s relationships with significant others by relying on extrinsic 
sources” (Melton et al., 2007, p. 398).  These extrinsic sources would be collateral 
interviews with individuals who knew the testator.  Complicating matters, some of the 
sources of data may be biased, and therefore when the interviewed individuals have a 
stake in the will contest, their information is suspect.  Equally problematic is the 
investigation about whether the testator understood his disposition plan.  In a 
retrospective assessment, an evaluator must glean from outside source material as to why 
the testator made a particular disposition.  A testator’s direct heir may contest the will 
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because the testator excludes his natural heirs in favor others who are deemed 
“unnatural”.  The evaluator must attempt to determine what led to the testator’s decision 
(Melton et al., 2007).    
 Present-state assessment of testamentary competence.  In some cases of 
assessment of testamentary competence, the testator is available for evaluation.  This can 
occur when an individual’s attorney advises the client to obtain an evaluation prior to 
execution of the will in the hope of preventing the contesting of the will after the testator 
has died.  Prospective assessment is particularly desirable when the testator exhibits signs 
of dementia, or has a psychiatric or physical disorder that caused periods of incapacity 
(Bartol & Bartol, 2004).  Further, an attorney should suggest that a testator have a 
prospective assessment if the attorney anticipates the contesting of the will because of 1) 
contentious relations between the testator and his heirs, 2) a disposition to someone other 
than the testator’s natural heirs, or 3) a highly-valued estate.   
 There are some risks to having an evaluator conduct a prospective assessment.  
There is no guarantee that the evaluator will find that a testator has the capacities 
associated with testamentary competence.  The evaluator must make an impartial 
determination based on the facts at hand (Specialty Guidelines for Forensic 
Psychologists, 1991).  The testator may lose the chance to make a will if the evaluation is 
conducted under circumstances that allow all parties (testators and heirs) access to the 
findings.  Prospective assessments of testamentary competence are reportedly infrequent, 
so it is unclear how a court would consider such evidence (Champine, 2006). 6  However, 
                                                 
6 How frequently the evaluation of testamentary capacity is present-state versus retrospective is an 
empirical question worth investigating.  There is limited empirical data on the subject.  Champine (2006) 
searched Westlaw and found 104 decisions from 2000-2004 that involved the issue of whether the testator’s 
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even with these limitations, a prospective assessment should often yield evidence 
superior to that typically available in traditional probate (Champine, 2006).  A clearer 
understanding of the functional abilities that comprise testamentary competence would 
provide an important first step in the larger process of developing a tool to measure such 
capacities in a reliable and valid way, which would then be available to assist courts in 
deciding and attorneys in representing clients on the legal question of testamentary 
competence. 
Current Study 
Rationale 
 The current study seeks to define legally relevant functional abilities that should 
be evaluated to determine whether is a person is competent to make a will.  There are 
three main justifications for conducting this study now.  First, the Uniform Probate Code 
(§ 2-501, 2006) requires that a testator be of “sound mind” when creating a will.  Courts 
in different jurisdictions have noted various factors to consider in determining whether 
the testator is of sound mind.  The Supreme Court and the federal legislature have not set 
forth a standard test to determine competence to make a will, as testamentary competence 
is governed by state statutes.  Although many state courts consider similar elements, there 
is no apparent consensus on the functional demands required.  Second, researchers have 
noted that there is little empirical research on the functional abilities needed to make a 
will (Champine, 2006; Marson et al., 2004).  Finally, unlike some other competencies, 
                                                                                                                                     
mental state satisfied the standard for testamentary capacity.  Of 104 cases, 5 cases involved present state 
evaluations of testamentary capacity.  She found perfect correlation between the expert assessment and the 
outcome of the will contests.  However, she does note that a larger sample would not yield the same results.   
A larger sample is presently not available because of the infrequency of present state evaluations done by 
experts. 
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there is no instrument that assists forensic mental health evaluators in determining a 
testator’s competence to make a will.  With the increased life span, elderly people will 
make up a larger portion of the population.  Since individuals often wait until later in life 
to make wills (Haldipur & Ward, 1996), there will be an increased need to evaluate 
competency in this area.    
 The research will focus on the psycholegal constructs and functional abilities that 
appear relevant to the domain of testamentary competence.  The study will survey 
professionals whose opinion is relevant to the issue of testamentary competence.  The 
broad research question that will be addressed in the proposed study focuses on the 
functional abilities that comprise testamentary competence.  In order to address this 
question, I will examine several variables that the literature suggests are the most 
promising and relevant.   
Hypotheses 
It is hypothesized that when presented with a vignette and the variables of (a) 
knowing that the will transfers property, (b) knowing important assets owned, (c) able to 
name heirs and detail relationship, and (d) able to explain a non-delusional rationale are 
manipulated, there will be a statistically significant main effect for each of these four 
factors, with the dependent variable consisting of respondents’ rating of the extent to 
which the enumerated capacities are sufficient to allow the testator to make a will.  These 
four variables correspond with the four elements (understanding nature of will, 
understanding nature and extent of property, knowing natural objects of bounty, and 
understanding the plan for distribution of assets) most often associated with competence 
to make a will.   
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 More specifically, it is hypothesized that a survey of practicing psychologists with 
interests in aging or forensic psychology will result in the following based on their self 
report. 
1.  The testator knowing that the will transfers property will be associated 
with a higher rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will than when 
the testator does not know that the will transfers property. 
2.  The testator knowing his or her important assets will be associated with a 
higher rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will than when the 
testator does not know his or her important assets. 
3.  The testator being able to name his or her heirs and detail the relationship 
will be associated with a higher rated level of sufficient capacity for 
making a will than when the testator cannot name his or her heirs. 
4.  The testator being able to explain his or her distribution plan in a non-
delusional way will be associated with a higher rated level of sufficient 
capacity for making a will than when the testator cannot explain his or her 
distribution plan in a non-delusional way. 
5.   There will be a statistically significant interaction among all 4 variables 
(knowing that the will transfers property, knowing important assets 
owned, ability to name heirs and detail relationship, ability to explain a 
non-delusional rationale).  
6.  Demographic characteristics of the participant (race, gender, years of 
practice, number of forensic evaluations conducted in past year and in 
career, number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in 
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past year and in career, knowledge of state regulations, and work location) 
will be related to rating level of sufficient capacity.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were doctoral-level psychologists who are members of the American 
Psychological Association, who express a particular interest/expertise in two areas:  aging 
or forensic psychology.  All participation was voluntary.  Inclusion criteria included 
fluency in English, as all measures were only presented in English, and age of at least 18 
years.  A total of 374 psychologists (27% of the total of 1385 who were invited to 
participate) responded to the survey.  A number of surveys (11%, n = 42) had to be 
excluded because they were missing a number of items.  Overall, 190 (57.2%) 
participants were male, 140 (42.2%) were female, and 2 (0.6%) did not indicate their 
gender.  The ethnic breakdown of the participants consisted of 2.4% African 
American/Black (n = 8), 90.4% Caucasian (n = 300), 1.5% Asian American (n = 5), 2.4% 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 8), and 2.1% Other (n = 7).  One participant (0.3%) did not indicate 
his or her ethnic background.  There was a wide range of years of practice reported from 
psychologists from those who have been practicing for a couple of years to those who 
have been practicing for many years (range = 2-51 years).  The mean number of years of 
practice reported was 21.72 with a standard deviation of 11.11.  The median number of 
years of practice reported was 21.00, and the mode was 20.00 years.   
 A power analysis revealed that for a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA (all between subjects 
factors) with an alpha of .05, a medium effect size (f = .25) for knowing that the will 
transfers property, knowing important assets owned, ability to name heirs and detail 
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relationship, ability to explain a non-delusional rationale, and a medium effect size (f = 
.25) for the interaction of knowing that the will transfers property, knowing important 
assets owned, ability to name heirs and detail relationship, ability to explain a non-
delusional rationale, and all four variables together, 332 participants yielded a power of 
1.00 for the corrected model.  This indicates that it is very likely that a result was 
detected if it existed.7 
Design 
 The study uses a 2 (knowing will transfers property, yes or no) x 2 (knowing 
important assets owned, yes or no) x 2 (able to name heirs and detail relationship, yes or 
no) x 2 (able to explain a non-delusional rationale, yes or no) between subjects design.  
Sixteen versions of a vignette, systematically manipulating the 4 dichotomous variables, 
may be seen in Appendix B.  The vignette was adapted from Melton et al. (2007).  Since 
testamentary competence is determined by state statute, there is no single standard that 
every state follows.  Furthermore, the scenario from Melton et al. (2007) closely matched 
the variables that this study will consider.   
In the vignette, the four variables are as follows:  (1) knowing that the will transfers 
property, (2) knowing important assets owned, (3) ability to name heirs and detail 
relationship, and (4) ability to explain a non-delusional rationale.  Each variable is 
dichotomous.  These four variables were chosen because they represent the elements that 
comprise competence to make a will.  Within each element, the variable selected was the 
one that appeared most frequently in the legal and psychological literature.  
                                                 
7 The power value was the observed power reported in the SPSS output.  The power was also determined 
according the power tables in Cohen (1988), which indicated a power greater than .995. 
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The dependent variable was the respondent’s rating of the sufficiency of the 
testator’s capacities to make a will.  For each vignette, respondents will rate this 
sufficiency on a five point scale: entirely insufficient, largely insufficient, mixed 
evidence, largely sufficient, and entirely sufficient.  Additionally, the respondent was 
asked whether additional variables are important in gauging whether a testator has 
sufficient capacities to make a will.  These additional survey variables were selected 
because those variables appeared most frequently in the legal and psychological 
literature.   
Procedures 
 Each participant in the sample of psychologists was randomly assigned to one of 
sixteen groups.  All participants received a brief email that explained the study and the 
procedures and one follow-up reminder email approximately two weeks after the first 
email (Appendix A).  The email informed the psychologists that the survey should take 
no longer than 10 minutes to complete.  Each psychologist was invited to participate in an 
online survey.  Care was taken to protect the anonymity of the participants; no 
identifiable information was collected from them.  The first part presented the 
participants with one of the sixteen vignettes (Appendix B) depending on the group to 
which the psychologist was randomly assigned, and the participant was asked to answer a 
question based on the vignette.  Next, the participants were presented with a survey about 
important variables relevant to testamentary competence (Appendix C), followed by 
demographic questions asking about gender, race, geographic area of practice, years of 
experience, experience with psychological evaluations generally, experience with 
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evaluations of competence to make a will, knowledge of applicable law, and work 
location (Appendix D).  
Analyses 
The main statistical analysis was a 2 (knowing will transfers property) x 2 
(knowing important assets owned) x 2 (able to name heirs and detail relationship) x 2 
(able to explain to a non-delusional rationale) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA 
is the proper analytic tool when analyzing a factorial design of four independent variables 
and two levels of each independent variable, and a continuous dependent variable.  On 
the vignette, psychologists rated the dependent variable, sufficiency of capacities for 
making a will, on a five point scale:  entirely insufficient, largely insufficient, mixed 
evidence, largely sufficient, entirely sufficient.  For statistical analysis, this scale was 
treated as continuous.   
For the survey questionnaire, there were 21 variables that participants were asked 
to rate on a 5-point scale of importance in determining capacity (1=extremely 
unimportant, 2= unimportant, 3= between unimportant and important, 4=important, 
5=extremely important).  Multiple t-tests were used to assess whether the mean of each 
variable was significantly different from the scale midpoint (3).8  Variables, which had 
significantly higher means than 3, were retained for future research, while variables with 
means significantly lower than 3 were discarded.   Bivariate analyses between all of the 
21 variables were run and a correlation matrix to determine which variables are 
significantly related was created.  Finally, relevant demographic variables were analyzed.   
 
                                                 
8 Running multiple t-tests could result in familywise error.  To adjust, I used the conservative Bonferroni 
method; however, without the adjustment typically gives better results.    
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
Participants were asked about the number of forensic evaluations that they 
conducted in the past year and in their career.  The data were first analyzed for the 
presence of outliers9.  There was a large range in the number of evaluations conducted in 
the past year.  The mean number of forensic evaluations conducted in the past year was 
64.10 with a standard deviation of 152.64, and the median and mode were 20.00 and 0.00 
respectively.  Similarly, there was a large range reported for the number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in their career.  The mean number of evaluations reported was 
1077.42 with a standard deviation 2082.96, and the median and mode were 300.00 and 
0.00 respectively. 
Since the study was focused on the functional capacities that comprise 
competence to make a will, participants were asked about the number of testamentary 
competence evaluations they conducted in the past year and in the their career.  The range 
reported was much smaller than for forensic evaluations.  The mean number of 
evaluations of testamentary competence conducted in the past year was 0.66 with a 
standard deviation of 2.18, and the median and mode were both reported as 0.00.  For the 
number of testamentary competence evaluations conducted in their career, the mean 
number reported was 9.76 with a standard deviation of 33.54, and the median and mode 
were both reported as 0.00.   
As determinations of testamentary competence are guided by local laws, 
participants were asked to report their state of practice.  All of the states were represented 
                                                 
9 Any number that fell beyond three standard deviations from the mean was discarded from the data for 
purposes of statistical analyses.   
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in the responding sample except for Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, 
South Carolina, and Utah (see Table 1).  The sample also included respondents from 
Puerto Rico and Canada.  A small number of participants reported that they do not 
practice (3.0%, n = 11), and 3 people (0.9%) did not respond to that question.  The 
majority of participants reported working in an urban setting (56.3%, n = 187), while the 
rest of sample noted that worked in either a suburban setting (30.4%, n = 101) or a rural 
setting (12.0%, n = 40).  A small number of participants (1.2%, n = 4) declined to answer 
that question.  A little than more than half of the sample (56.0%, n = 186) were not 
familiar with their state’s regulations pertaining to wills, while the rest were familiar 
(43.1%, n = 143). An extremely small number of individuals did not answer the question 
(0.9%, n = 3).     
Results of Specific Hypotheses 
 A 2 (knowing will transfers property) x 2 (knowing important assets owned) x 2 
(able to name heirs and detail relationship) x 2 (able to explain to a non-delusional 
rationale) ANOVA was conducted to examine the relationship among the four factors 
garnered from the psycholegal literature and the dependent variable of sufficiency of 
competence to make a will.  ANOVA has three assumptions: 1) normality, 2) 
homogeneity of variance, and 3) independence.  As to the first assumption, the 
populations from which the samples are drawn must be normal.  With a large sample, this 
is usually not an issue; further, ANOVA cutoff scores are reasonably accurate even when 
the population is moderately far from normal.  The second assumption, homogeneity of 
variance, refers to the assumption that the variances in the different groups in the design 
are identical or the spread of scores in each cell in the design is equivalent.  The result 
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from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variable shows that result is not significant (p < 
.496), suggesting that the assumption of equal variances has not been violated.   Finally, 
independence means that observations in each sample must be independent.  See Table 2 
for a summary of the results of the ANOVA analysis.   
 Hypotheses were tested as follows: 
The testator knowing that the will transfers property will be associated with a 
higher rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will than when the testator does not 
know that the will transfers property. 
 The results indicated that there was a main effect for the testator knowing that the 
will transfers property [F(1, 315) = 6.07,  p < .014].  The effect size was small (partial eta 
squared = .02).  Post-hoc tests were unnecessary, as the variable was dichotomous.  The 
mean for the testator knowing that the will transfers property was 2.71 with a standard 
deviation of .977,  while the mean for the testator not knowing that the will transfers 
property was 2.60 with a standard deviation of .897.   
The testator knowing his or her important assets will be associated with a higher 
rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will than when the testator does not know 
his or her important assets. 
The results indicated that there was a main effect for the testator knowing 
important assets owned [F(1, 315) = 31.466,  p < .001], with a medium effect size (partial 
eta squared = .09).  Post-hoc tests were unnecessary, as the variable was dichotomous.  
The mean for the testator knowing important assets owned was 2.90 with a standard 
deviation of .907, while the mean for the testator not knowing important assets owned 
was 2.40 with a standard deviation of .904.   
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The testator being able to name his or her heirs and detail the relationship will be 
associated with a higher rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will than when the 
testator cannot name his or her heirs. 
The results indicated that there was a main effect for the testator being able to 
name heirs and detail relationships [F(1, 315) = 80.053,  p < .001], and the effect size was 
large (partial eta squared = .203).  Post-hoc tests were unnecessary, as the variable was 
dichotomous.  The mean for the testator being able to name heirs and detail relationships 
was 3.06 with a standard deviation of .834, while the mean for the testator not being able 
to name heirs and detail relationships was 2.25 with a standard deviation of .862.   
The testator being able to explain his or her distribution plan in a non-delusional 
way will be associated with a higher rated level of sufficient capacity for making a will 
than when the testator cannot explain his or her distribution plan in a non-delusional 
way. 
The results indicated that there was a main effect for the testator being able to 
explain the distribution plan in a non-delusional way [F(1, 315) = 11.508,  p < .001].  The 
effect size was small (partial eta squared = .04).  Post-hoc tests were unnecessary, as the 
variable was dichotomous.  The mean for the testator being able to explain the 
distribution plan in a non-delusional way was 2.81 with a standard deviation of .936, 
while the mean for the testator not being able to explain the distribution plan in a non-
delusional way was 2.48 with a standard deviation of .914.   
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There will be a statistically significant interaction among all 4 variables (knowing 
that the will transfers property, knowing important assets owned, ability to name heirs 
and detail relationship, ability to explain a non-delusional rationale). 
Results revealed that there was a significant four-way interaction among the four 
independent variables [F(1, 315) = 4.547,  p < .034].  This effect size was small (partial 
eta squared = .01).  The four-way interaction was graphed (See Figure 1).  Analysis of the 
graph showed two significant two-way interactions, as discussed below.   
When the testator has a non-delusional rationale and knows his heirs, there is no 
interaction between his knowing he is transferring property and knowing his important 
assets [F (1, 90) = .045, p < .833].  When the testator has a non-delusional rationale and 
knows his important assets, but does not know his heirs, he is considered less competent 
if he does not know he is transferring property (M = 2.29) than if he does (M = 3.11) 
[t(33) = -3.006, p < .005].  However, if the testator has a non-delusional rationale, but 
does not know his heirs or his important assets, then his level of rated competence does 
not depend on whether he knows he is transferring property (MNO = 2.22; MYES = 2.17; 
t(45) = .216, p < . 830).  Overall, when the testator has a non-delusional rationale but 
does not know his heirs, there is interaction between knowing important assets and 
knowing he is transferring property [F(1, 78) = 5.822, p < .018].  This interaction is 
significant.  When a Bonferroni correction is applied, the main effects and interaction 
remain.10   
 
                                                 
10 Even though multiple analyses were conducted, alpha was not adjusted with a Bonferroni correction.  A 
correction did not seem necessary, as only three analyses were conducted.  However, a Bonferroni 
correction would have set alpha at .02, which would not have changed the results from what was reported.   
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When the testator knows his heirs, but his rationale is delusional and he doesn’t 
know he is transferring property, it does not make a difference whether he knows his 
important assets (MNO = 3.00; MYES = 2.82; t(37) = .681, p < .500).  However, when the 
testator knows his heirs and knows that he is transferring property, but has a delusional 
rationale, he is seen as less competent when he does not know his important assets (M = 
2.64) than when he does (M = 3.29) [t(29) = -2.531, p < .017].  Overall, when the testator 
has a delusional rationale but knows his heirs, there is an interaction between knowing 
important assets and knowing he is transferring property [F (1, 66) = 4.881, p < .031].  
This interaction is significant, and when a Bonferroni correction is applied, the main 
effects remain but the interaction approaches significance.11  When the testator has a 
delusional rationale and does not know his heirs, there is no significant interaction 
between knowing important assets and knowing that he is transferring property [F(1, 81) 
= .122, p < . 728]. 
Additionally, the ANOVA results also indicated a significant two-way interaction 
of whether the testator knows that the will transfers property and whether the testator 
knows important assets owned [F(1, 315) = 7.148, p < .008] with a small effect size 
(partial eta squared = .02) (see Figure 2).  An analysis of simple main effects revealed 
that there was a significant result for whether the testator knows that the will transfers 
property when the testator knows important assets owned [F(1, 328) = 6.06, p < .014].  
Similarly, the analysis also resulted in a significant effect for whether the testator knows 
important assets owned when the testator knows that the will transferred property [F(1, 
                                                 
11 Even though multiple analyses were conducted, alpha was not adjusted with a Bonferroni correction.  A 
correction did not seem necessary, as only three analyses were conducted.  However, a Bonferroni 
correction would have set alpha at .02, which would not have changed the results in terms of the interaction 
which would then only approach significance. 
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328) = 28.52, p < .001]. All other interactions, the five remaining two-way and the four 
three-way, produced non-significant results.  
Demographic characteristics of the participant (race, gender, years of practice, 
number of forensic evaluations conducted in past year and in career, number of 
competence to make a will evaluations conducted in past year and in career, knowledge 
of state regulations, and work location) will be related to rating level of sufficient 
capacity.  
 A multiple regression was performed using sufficiency to make a will as the 
outcome variable (see Table 3).  The following predictors, all participant attributes or 
ratings, were used: race, gender, years of practice, number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in past year and in career, number of competence to make a will evaluations 
conducted in past year and in career, knowledge of state regulations, and work location.  
Variables with more than two groups (race and work location) were dummy coded to 
make two groups.   There are a number of assumptions when using a multiple regression.  
First, Stevens (1996) suggests that “for social science research, about 15 subjects per 
predictor are needed for a reliable equation” (p. 72).   There were at least 29 participants 
for each predictor variable.  Also, there should be no perfect multicollinearity.  A scan of 
the correlation matrix for the predictor variables found that none of them correlated very 
highly with another (as defined by correlations of above .80 or .90).  Further, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and the tolerance statistic indicate that there was not an issue with 
multicollinearity.  There should also be a lack of autocorrelation; this can be checked 
using the Durbin-Watson test, which tests for serial correlations between errors.  Field 
(2009) notes that “as a very conservative rule of thumb values less than 1 or greater than 
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3 are definitely cause for concern” (p. 221).  However, the Durbin-Watson statistic for 
this sample was 1.573, suggesting the assumption was not violated.  Variables were 
checked for outliers, and any values that fell beyond three standard deviations from their 
respective mean were discarded for purposes of the multiple regression analysis.  The 
scatterplot (Figure 3) reveals the assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity appear 
not to have been violated.  Finally, the histogram (Figure 4) similarly shows that the data 
is roughly normal.       
The overall model for the multiple regression analysis was significant [F (10, 284) 
= 2.334, p < .012].  These variables predict 7.6% of the total variance (R2 = .076).  Only 
three variables (years of practice, number of forensic evaluations conducted in the past 
year, and number of forensic evaluations conducted in career) contributed significantly to 
predicting this outcome.  The results suggest that psychologists who have greater years of 
practice and more practice conducting forensic evaluations in a given year are more 
likely to rate a testator as having sufficient capacity to make a will.  Conversely, a 
psychologist with more opportunities to conduct forensic evaluations over his or her 
career will be less likely to rate a testator as having sufficient capacity to make a will.  
This result seems to be inconsistent and will be addressed later in the discussion section.   
In light of the idiosyncratic finding mentioned above, number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in the past year and number of forensic evaluations in career were 
recoded.  First, the variables were recoded into 0s, which was psychologists who reported 
conducting no evaluations, and 1s, which was psychologists who reported conducting 
more than one evaluation.  This recoding was done both for number of forensic 
evaluations in past year and the number of forensic evaluations in career.  For the past 
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year variable, there were 93 coded as 0 (no experience with forensic evaluations), and 
232 coded as 1, (experience with forensic evaluations).  The multiple regression analysis 
was rerun with the recoded variables, and the overall model was not significant [F (10, 
284) = 1.361, p < .198]. Number of forensic evaluations conducted in the past year and 
number of forensic evaluations conducted in career were in the same direction unlike the 
original regression; however, these variables did not contribute significantly to the overall 
model.   
To test the effects of the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in the past year on the rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will, a 
one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA 1) was conducted.  To assess for the 
existence of covariates, between groups tests were run on the demographic variables.  
The results indicated that the two groups in the recoded variable of number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in the past year differed significantly for gender [χ2 (1, n = 324) = 
4.87, p < .027], knowledge of state regulations [χ2 (1, n = 324) = 9.89, p < .002], and 
number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in career [(M0=2.82, 
SD0=10.03; M1=12.16, SD1=38.66; t(288) = -3.367, p < .001].  Thus, gender, knowledge 
of state regulations, and number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in 
career were used as covariates in the ANCOVA 1 analysis.  Results showed that there 
was not a significant difference in rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will for 
the no experience and experience groups in the past year after controlling for the 
covariates [F(1, 311) = .51, p < .48, partial eta squared = .002]. 
To test the effects of the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in career on the rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will, a one-way 
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analysis of covariance (ANCOVA 2) was conducted.  To assess for the existence of 
covariates, between groups tests were run on the demographic variables.  The results 
indicated that the two groups in the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in career differed significantly for gender [χ2 (1, n = 323) = 7.75, p < .005], 
knowledge of state regulations [χ2 (1, n = 323) = 10.25, p < .001], number of competence 
to a make a will evaluations conducted in the past year [(M0=0.07, SD0=0.45; M1=0.73, 
SD1=2.33; t(308) = -4.223, p < .001], and number of competence to make a will 
evaluations conducted in career [(M0=0.24, SD0=1.50; M1=11.04, SD1=35.824; t(277) = 
-4.944, p < .001].  Thus, gender, knowledge of state regulations, number of competence 
to a make a will evaluations conducted in the past year, and number of competence to 
make a will evaluations conducted in career were used as covariates in the ANCOV
analysis.  Results showed that there was not a significant difference in rating of 
sufficiency of competence to make a will for the no experience group and experience 
group in career after controlling for the covariates [F(1, 300) = .96, p < .33, partial eta 
squared = .003]. 
A 2 
Since the recoding described above led to unequal subgroups, number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in the past year and number of forensic evaluations in career were 
recoded a second way representing low experience versus high experience.  Variables 
were recoded into 0s representing low experience and those coded as 1s representing high 
experience.  This recoding was done both for the variable number of forensic evaluations 
in past year and the variable number of forensic evaluations in career.  For the past year 
variable, there were 161 coded as 0 which would represent low experience with forensic 
evaluations, and 164 coded as 1 which would represent high experience with forensic 
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evaluations.  The multiple regression analysis was rerun with the recoded variables, and 
the overall model was not significant [F (10, 284) = 1.788, p < .062]. Number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in the past year and number of forensic evaluations conducted in 
career were in opposite directions like the original regression; however, these variables 
did contribute significantly to the overall model.   
To test the effects of the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in the past year on the rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will, a 
one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA 3) was conducted.  To assess for the 
existence of covariates, between groups tests were run on the demographic variables.  
The results indicated that the two groups in the recoded variable of number of forensic 
evaluations conducted in the past year differed significantly for gender [χ2 (1, n = 324) = 
4.98, p < .026], race [p < .017 , Fisher’s exact test], knowledge of state regulations [χ2 (1, 
n = 324) = 5.10, p < .024], number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted 
in the past year[(M0=0.41, SD0=1.81; M1=0.89, SD1=2.48; t(286) = -1.964, p < .05], and
number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in career [(M
 
0=4.30, 
SD0=13.86; M1=14.55, SD1=44.31; t(192) = -2.798, p < .001].  Thus, gender, race, 
knowledge of state regulations, number of competence to make a will evaluations in the 
past year, and number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in career were 
used as covariates in the ANCOVA 3 analysis.  Results showed that there was not a 
significant difference in rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will for the low 
experience group and high experience group in the past year after controlling for the 
covariates [F(1, 299) = 1.40, p < .24, partial eta squared = .005]. 
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To test the effects of the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in career on the rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will, a one-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA 4) was conducted.  To assess for the existence of 
covariates, between groups tests were run on the demographic variables.  The results 
indicated that the two groups in the recoded variable of number of forensic evaluations 
conducted in career differed significantly for gender [χ2 (1, n = 323) = 13.42, p < .001], 
race [p < .01 , Fisher’s exact test], knowledge of state regulations [χ2 (1, n = 323) = 
18.66, p < .001], years of practice [(M0=18.25, SD0=10.92; M1=24.59, SD1=10.25; 
t(314) = -5.310, p < .001], and number of competence to make a will evaluations 
conducted in career [(M0=4.56, SD0=16.55; M1=14.18, SD1=43.26; t(211) = -2.644, p <
.009].  Thus, gender, race, knowledge of state regulations, years of practice, an
of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in career were used as covariates in 
the ANCOVA 4 analysis.  Results showed that there was not a significant difference in 
rating of sufficiency of competence to make a will for the low experience group and the
high experience group in career after controlling for the covariates [F(1, 299) = .46, p < 
.50, partial eta squared = .00
 
d number 
 
2]. 
Additional Analyses 
 As part of the survey, participants were asked to rate a number of variables based 
on their importance in determining capacity to make a will.  The 21 variables are:  
• whether testator knows that he will die;  
• whether testator knows that the will is a written document;  
• whether testator knows that the will transfers property to his or her heirs;  
• whether testator knows that the will takes effect after death;  
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• whether testator can express his or her understanding verbally;  
• whether testator knows what important assets s/he owns;  
• whether testator knows the financial value of his or her assets;  
• whether testator knows the sentimental value of his or her assets;  
• whether testator knows his or her immediate family members;  
• whether testator knows whether his or her heirs are dead or alive;  
• whether testator knows difference between family, significant others, and close 
friends versus others;  
• whether testator understands that s/he is free to disinherit his or her heirs;  
• whether testator is able to name heirs;  
• whether testator is able to detail his or her relationship with his or her heirs;  
• whether testator can articulate some basic plan for distribution of property;  
• whether testator can articulate the consequences of his or her will;  
• whether testator can explain his or her rationale of distribution;  
• whether testator can justify if certain individuals are excluded from the will;  
• whether testator knows who the executor (appointed representative) of the will is; 
• whether testator’s rationale for distribution is based in reality; and  
• the size of the estate.   
 Correlations were conducted to gauge whether there were significant relationships 
among the variables and if so, the strength and direction of such relationships.  If one 
wants to establish if the correlation is significant, then the sampling distribution must be 
normally distributed.  With such a large sample, normality can be assumed.  Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007) point out that with reasonably large samples, skewness will not “make 
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a substantive difference in the analysis,” and the risk of kurtosis is reduced with a large 
sample (greater than 200) (p. 80).    
 Out of a total of 210 correlations, 173 were significant (see Table 4).  When a 
Bonferroni correction is applied, 107 of the significant correlations remain.  All of the 
significant correlations suggested a positive relationship, and the strength of the 
relationship ranged from r = .11 to r = .65).  Some of the highest correlations are 
noteworthy.  There was a significant relationship between the importance of the testator 
knowing financial value of assets and the importance of the testator knowing what 
important assets are owned (r = .65, p < .01).  The importance of the testator knowing 
immediate family members was significantly correlated with (1) the importance of the 
testator knowing whether heirs are dead or alive (r = .58, p < .01), (2) the importance of 
the testator knowing the difference between family, significant others, and close friends 
versus others (r = .41, p < .01), and (3) the importance of the testator being able to detail 
his or her relationship with his or her heirs (r = .42, p < .01).  The importance of the 
testator being able to detail relationships with heirs was also correlated with (1) the 
importance of testator knowing the difference between family, significant others, and 
close friends versus others (r = .44, p < .01), (2) the importance of the testator being able 
to name heirs (r = .48, p < .01), (3) the importance of testator explaining a rationale of 
distribution (r = .49, p < .01), and (4) the importance of the testator justifying if certain 
individuals are excluded from the will (r = .50, p < .01).    
Multiple single sample t-tests were used to assess whether the mean of each 
variable was significantly different from the scale midpoint (3).  Participants rated 20 of 
the 21 variables as significantly different from the scale midpoint.  Of those 20, 19 
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variables were rated as significantly higher than the scale midpoint while only one, the 
importance of size of the estate, was rated significantly lower.   
Table 5 lists the results of the multiple t-tests.  Results with the highest means are 
reported.  The variable of importance of testator knowing that will transfers property to 
heirs and the variable of importance of testator knowing that will takes effect after death 
were rated as significantly higher than the scale midpoint [(M=4.65), t(330) = 48.079, p < 
.001, d = 2.64, large effect size; (M=4.57), t(331) = 44.706, p < .001, d = 2.45, large 
effect size, respectively].  Further, the participants rated the variables of importance of 
testator knowing heirs are dead or alive and importance of testator understanding that 
s/he is free to disinherit heirs as significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale 
[(M=4.44), t(330) = 33.484, p < .001, d = 1.84, large effect size; (M=4.39), t(330) = 
37.865, p < .001, d = 2.08, large effect size, respectively].  Finally, the importance of 
testator knowing important assets owned was rated significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint [M=4.35); t(329) = 36.999, p < .001, d = 2.04, large effect size]. 
There was a concern about the number of planned contrasts and the introduction 
of familywise error.  Often after making several comparisons, the chance of the results 
being significant increases greatly.  To account for this possibility, the value of alpha was 
adjusted from .05 to .002 using the Bonferroni procedure.  All of the p values remained 
significant even when using this Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level.   
Discussion 
 Unlike other legal competencies, there is little empirical research in the area of 
testamentary competence, or competence to make a will.  The current study attempted to 
identify the functional capacities associated with competence to make a will by surveying 
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practicing psychologists to obtain their views about the importance of specified domains.  
After a review of the legal and psychological literature, four main factors were identified 
that were common in many of the will statutes across jurisdictions.  Additionally, other 
potential capacities were identified by further deconstructing the statutes and culling 
capacities from research on other legal competencies.  
Knowing Will Transfers Property 
 The current study hypothesized that the testator knowing that a will transferred 
property would be associated with a higher rating of sufficiency of capacity to make a 
will.  A main effect was observed for this factor.  Psychologists rated the hypothesized 
testator, Ms. A., as more sufficient to make a will when she knew that the will transferred 
property.  When she had this knowledge, she knew, for example, that her will would give 
her property to an heir of her choosing.  It appears that understanding the nature of a will 
does play a role in determining whether someone has sufficient capacity to make a will.  
However, even though the difference between knowing and not knowing was statistically 
significant, there may not be as much practical significance, as the effect size was small.  
Moreover, both values fell below a score of 3, which meant that participants were rating 
it as lower than the midpoint on a 5-point scale reflecting level of importance.  This main 
effect must be interpreted in light of the significant interactions found and will be 
discussed in later in this section.    
Knowing Important Assets Owned 
 It was also hypothesized that the testator knowing important assets owned would 
be associated with a higher rating of sufficiency of capacity to make a will.  A main 
effect was observed with this factor, as psychologists rated Ms. A as being more 
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sufficient in her capacities when she knew her important assets owned.   Ms. A. was able 
to list important assets, like a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  
In the vignettes where she possessed this ability, she was also able to give an accurate 
representation of their worth.  While knowing important assets impinges on a judgment 
of whether someone has sufficient capacity to make a will, the values for this factor also 
fell below a score of 3.  Although the difference was statistically significant, there may 
not be much practical significance, as the effect size was only medium.  Moreover, this 
main effect must be interpreted in light of the significant interactions found and will be 
discussed in later in this section. 
Knowing Heirs and Being Able to Detail Relationship 
 There was a main effect for the testator knowing his or her heirs and being able to 
detail the relationship, as hypothesized.  When Ms. A. was able to recognize her offspring 
as an heir and identify the heir as her daughter, psychologists rated her sufficiency as 
higher than when she could not perform this task.  The example in the vignette is an 
example of an “unnatural disposition,” a disposition that excludes family members and 
leaves property to someone or something that would appear not to have much meaning to 
the testator or at least as much meaning to the testator as his or her natural heir.  Ms. A. 
understood that she had a daughter as her natural heir, but chose to give her estate to a 
foundation.  For this variable, there was statistical significance for the main effect, and 
the difference may be practically significant, as there was a large effect size.  Also, the 
mean for knowing heirs and being able to detail the relationship was slightly higher than 
the value of 3.  Further, this main effect must be interpreted in light of the significant 
interactions found and will be discussed in later in this section.     
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Being Able to Explain a Non-Delusional Rationale  
 A main effect was found if the testator was able to explain the plan for 
distribution in a non-delusional way.  Psychologists rated Ms. A. as more sufficient to 
make a will if she was able to articulate a rationale plan for distribution.  In the non-
delusional rationale vignette, Ms. A. was able to cite specific, rational examples as to 
why she was not leaving her estate to her daughter, citing such things as strained 
relations, being subjected to derogatory remarks, and being required to engage in 
unwanted activities.  The difference may not be practically significant even though the 
difference reached statistical significance because of the small effect size.  Additionally, 
this main effect must be interpreted in light of the significant interactions found and will 
be discussed in later in this section. 
Interaction of Knowing Will Transfers Property, Knowing Important Assets Owned, 
Knowing Heirs and Being Able to Detail Relationship, and Being Able to Explain a Non-
Delusional Rationale 
 As hypothesized, there was an interaction among all four variables on ratings of 
sufficiency of capacity to make a will.  The four variables related to the four elements 
(understanding nature of will, understanding nature and extent of property, knowing 
natural objects of bounty, and understanding the plan for distribution of assets) that were 
most often associated with competence to make a will after researching the relevant 
psycholegal literature.  The results suggest that all four variables are important in 
determining an individual’s competence to make a will.  When all of these factors were in 
the affirmative, there was no interaction noted among the variables, yet the presence of 
all the factors in the affirmative yielded that highest mean score of possible permutations 
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of the variables. Sufficient capacity to make a will does appear to depend on the testator’s 
knowledge that the will transfers property, the testator’s knowledge of his important 
assets, and the presence of a non-delusional rationale.  While testator’s knowledge of his 
or her heirs is a part of the interaction, it does not appear to influence sufficiency of 
competence as much as the other factors when they are in the affirmative.  Knowledge of 
heirs has a greater effect on the interaction when a testator has a delusional rationale, 
knows the will transfers property, and knows his or her important assets.  It would appear 
from the results that the four factors differentially affect sufficiency of competence to 
make a will, and the independent importance of one depends on the presence or absence 
of another.   
Based on the results from the sample, there can be some discussion about the 
relative importance of the four factors.  The interpretation of the four-way interaction did 
little in the way of showing relative importance of the four factors; however, the main 
effects can be examined but have to be considered in light of the interaction.  There was a 
large effect size for the factor of knowing heirs and being able to detail the relationship, 
and there was a medium effect size for the factor of knowing important assets owned.  
Both the factors of knowing the will transfers property and being able to explain a non-
delusional rationale had a small effect size.  Based on effect size, knowing heirs and 
being able to detail the relationship would appear to be the most important, and further in 
the interaction analysis this factor had differential effects depending on whether or not 
the other factors were in the affirmative.  Nonetheless, caution must be taken to interpret 
any main effects when there is the presence of an exceedingly complex four-way 
interaction, which is not likely to be replicated.  
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Further, there was one two-way interaction between whether the testator knows that 
the will transfers property and whether the testator knows important assets owned.  
Results suggested that the interaction was between the variables when both of the 
variables were in the affirmative.  The relationship between higher ratings of sufficiency 
of capacity to make a will and knowledge that the will transfers property depended on the 
testator knowing important assets owned.  Similarly, the relationship between higher 
ratings of sufficiency of capacity to make a will and knowledge of important assets 
owned depended on the testator knowing that the will transferred property.  Additionally, 
the results showed the remaining interactions that were not significant.   
Psychologist Demographic Characteristics 
 The results partially supported the hypothesis that demographic characteristics 
would be related to ratings of sufficiency of capacity to make a will.  However, only 
years of practice and psychologists’ experience with forensic evaluations contributed 
significantly this finding.  Psychologists who have greater years of practice and more 
practice conducting forensic evaluations in a given year were more likely to rate a testator 
as having sufficient capacity to make a will, but psychologists with more experience in 
conducting forensic evaluations over his or her career were less likely to rate a testator as 
having sufficient capacity to make a will.  There is an interesting but confusing finding--a 
greater number of forensic evaluations conducted in a career would lead psychologists to 
rate the testator in the vignette as have less sufficient capacity, but greater number of 
evaluations done in a year was associated with higher ratings.  It should not make a 
difference how experience is conceptualized; each conceptualization should yield the 
same results, whether both resulted in an increase in the rating or a decrease in the rating.  
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Here, though, the two conceptualizations lead to differing and opposite effects.   Perhaps, 
though, evaluation experience of psychologists is better operationalized by number of 
evaluations done in a career rather than measured by year.  This conception may account 
for the difference.  Another possible reason for this finding may be that psychologists 
with more experience overall in conducting forensic evaluations felt that there was not 
enough information in the vignette.  Psychologists usually have much more additional 
information, including records and collateral information, at their disposal when 
formulating an opinion on a legal competency.  While the vignette attempted to closely 
approximate the type of information to which a psychologist would have access, the 
vignette did not match the scope and the breadth of information usually afforded to 
psychologists. 
 Demographic characteristics of the raters account for a very small proportion of 
why sufficiency of capacity to make a will varies.  Only 7.6% of the overall variation in 
ratings of sufficiency of capacity to make a will was accounted for by the predictor 
variables (race, gender, years of practice, number of forensic evaluations conducted in 
past year and in career, number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in 
past year and in career, knowledge of state regulations, and work location).  The results 
suggest that while these variables had a significant effect on the sufficiency rating, there 
probably was not a practical effect.    
 Since similar conceptualizations of forensic experience led to differing and 
opposite results as described above, we decided to rerun the regression analysis with 
variables that had been transformed.  When forensic experience, whether recoded as 
never done an evaluation versus any experience whatsoever or low experience versus 
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high experience, was introduced into the regression model, the overall model was not 
significant.   
 Additionally, comparing the subgroups (none versus any experience and low 
versus high experience) on the same variables analyzed from the entire sample did not 
yield any significant results.  While for some demographic variables (gender, knowledge 
of state regulations, number of competence to make a will evaluations conducted in past 
year and in career), there were significant differences between the no experience 
subgroup and any experience subgroup in the past year and in the career, there was no 
significance difference between the subgroups in the ratings of sufficiency of competence 
to make a will, the main outcome variable.  Similarly, while for some demographic 
variables (gender, race, knowledge of state regulations, years of practice, number of 
competence to make a will evaluations conducted in past year and in career), there were 
significant differences between the low experience group and high experience group.  
However, there was also no significance difference between those subgroups in the 
ratings of sufficiency of competence to make a will.  While the assumptions did not 
appear to be violated in the regression analysis, perhaps the distribution of responses for 
the forensic experience variables were skewed and led to this odd finding.   
Other Potential Capacities 
 Additional capacities that are implicated in competence to make will according to 
the literature were studied.  These capacities were linked in some way to the four 
common elements that make up testamentary competence – understanding the nature of 
the will, understanding the nature and extent of property, knowing natural objects of 
one’s bounty, and understanding the plan for distribution of assets.  Psychologists were 
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asked to rate the importance of the variables in determining a testator’s capacity to make 
a will.   
Among the 21 variables tested for their importance in a correlation matrix, 82% of 
those correlations showed a statistically significant effect.  The results of the correlations 
gave an idea of not only which variables were important to psychologists but also which 
variables were important relative to each other.  Higher ratings of importance for a 
testator knowing the financial value of his assets were associated with higher ratings of 
importance for a testator knowing important assets owned.  These variables are related to 
understanding the nature and extent of property.  Higher ratings of importance of 
knowing family members were associated with higher ratings of importance of the 
testator knowing whether heirs are dead or alive, higher ratings of importance of the 
testator knowing the difference between close relations and other people, and higher 
ratings of importance of being able to detail relationships with heirs.  These variables are 
linked to the element of knowing natural objects of one’s bounty.  Higher ratings of 
importance of being able to detail relationships with heirs was also associated higher 
ratings of importance of the testator knowing the difference between close relations and 
other people, higher ratings of importance of testator being able to name heirs, higher 
ratings of importance of testator explaining a rationale for distribution, and higher ratings 
of importance of testator justifying if certain individuals are excluded from the will.  
These variables span two elements – knowing natural objects of one’s bounty and 
understanding the plan for distribution of assets; however, these two elements would 
need to be interrelated as the testator would need to know the natural objects of one’s 
bounty to be able to cogently understand the plan for distribution of assets.  Higher 
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ratings of importance of the testator’s rationale being based in reality was associated with 
higher ratings of importance of testator explaining a rationale for distribution, and higher 
ratings of importance of testator justifying if certain individuals are excluded from the 
will, and these variables are connected to the element of understanding the plan for 
distribution of assets.  Finally, higher ratings of importance of the testator articulating the 
consequences of the will was associated with higher ratings of importance of the testator 
articulating some basic plan for distribution of property, and these variables are also 
linked to the element of understanding the plan for distribution.  It would appear from the 
results that variables that were subsumed within a particular element of testamentary 
capacity were seen as being highly correlated with each other.    
 Since the area of testamentary competence lacks empirical research, it was 
important to find out what variables could be retained for future research.  Most of the 
variables, 20 out of 21, were rated as significantly different than the midpoint of the 
scale.  Testator’s knowledge of the sentimental value of his or her assets was not rated 
significantly different from the midpoint of the scale.  Sentimentality was not mentioned 
in the review of the literature as a factor that is important in determining capacity to make 
a will.  However, the other factors were mentioned in the literature as potentially 
important variables of interest.  Out of the 19 remaining factors, only one, size of estate, 
was rated as significantly lower than the scale midpoint.  This result could reflect the 
conflicting case law as to relevance of size of the estate.  As noted earlier, some courts 
have found that size is not important to understanding the nature and extent of property.  
Other courts, though, have posited that there is a proportional relationship between the 
amount of knowledge required and the size of the estate.      
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Limitations 
 This study was designed to define legally relevant functional abilities that 
encompass competence to make a will.   This research was a beginning step in 
empirically defining these functional capacities by reviewing the legal and psychological 
literature followed by surveying professionals whose opinion is relevant to the issue of 
competence to make a will.  While an empirically supported method of gathering relevant 
psycholegal capacities (Douglas et al., 2003) was used, there were limitations in this 
study that should be addressed.  First, there is a potential limitation on the generalizability 
of the study.  The methodology attempted to capture psychologists who were familiar 
with aging individuals and forensic assessment.  There is an assumption that our sample 
is representative of this population.  Ideally, our sample would have included 
psychologists who were interested in aging and forensic psychology; however, the 
number produced from that overlap was much too small to achieve any kind of 
appreciable power.  In order to have a sufficiently large population from which to sample, 
the selection criteria were made more expansive.  This may have resulted in sampling 
some individuals who were neither experienced nor specialized in this area. 
 Further, there could be a limitation related to response bias, as psychologists who 
responded to an internet survey may be systematically different than those who did not 
respond.  Attempts were made to make the sample as representative as possible.  The 
sample was drawn from a national pool of psychologists and was a large sample size.  
Participants varied by race, and the breakdown of ethnicity was consistent with the 
demographic makeup of the American Psychological Association.  The sample probably 
did not perfectly match the population, but this was one of the first empirical attempts at 
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defining functional capacities.  Certainly this study needs replicating.  Given the response 
rate of 29%, it is possible that sample did not represent the larger population.   
 Another limitation of the current study is that we did not include any other 
professional groups, like attorneys or judges, whose opinion would be relevant to 
testamentary competence.  Inclusion of these individuals would have raised the required 
sample size considerably and impracticably for a study of the current magnitude, thus due 
to practical considerations, these individuals were excluded.  However, Douglas et al. 
(2003) point out that in order to develop an empirically sound forensic assessment 
instrument, it is necessary to include experts from both the psychological and legal 
disciplines.  This study serves as a first step in a multi-step process that would involve 
surveying mental health professionals, legal professionals, such as trust and estate 
lawyers and probate judges, or a combination of both.  
 The use of vignettes may also limit the results of this study.  Vignettes are usually 
time-limited, brief, and easy for the respondent to use.  This ease of use limits the amount 
of information that can be included while keeping the vignettes short.  Ratings could have 
been affected by the limited detail in the vignettes as well as the hypothetical nature of 
the vignettes themselves.  Information that psychologists generally obtain to make a 
decision about an individual’s competence is much more exhaustive than what could 
have been provided in a survey.  The vignettes incorporated factors that were identified 
by research and scholarship as relevant.  However, these factors are by no means an 
exhaustive list.  For example, cognitive deficits, particularly those related to declining 
age, can impinge on a finding of competence to make will.  The current study did not 
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focus on that particular variable, but nonetheless it could be an important aspect of this 
kind of competence. 
 Further, testamentary competence does not have a single unitary legal standard, as 
do some other legal competencies (e.g., competence to stand trial).  Testamentary 
competence is determined by state statute and state case law.  However, in the course of 
legal research for the literature review, commonalities among state law were found.  
However, it is possible that the weight given to the various factors tested in the survey 
could have varied by jurisdiction.  Accordingly, there could be some limitations as to 
whether the findings would uniformly apply in all jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, the sample 
encompassed most of the states, save for six states, so any systematic differences would 
have been randomly distributed across the sample. 
 Finally, a web based survey was utilized in this study.  This type of survey is 
relatively novel.  Large and diverse samples can be attained by virtue of an online survey 
rather than relying on a sample of convenience.  A potential problem exists for 
conducting online surveys when “researchers lose control over the environment in which 
the research is conducted” (Kraut et al., 2004, p. 108), and the authors suggest that 
researchers “contact the minimal number of potential subjects appropriate to their 
research goals” (p. 114).  Efforts were made to control the environment by soliciting 
participation from a select membership rather than all psychologists with interest in aging 
or forensic psychology who have access to the internet, as control would have been 
impossible.  Limitations of online survey have implicated the acceptability of the internet 
as a method of data collection and representativeness of the sample.  Research has shown 
the internet “remains unequally distributed throughout the U.S. population, … and it 
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remains the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that all members of the defined 
population have equal access to the technology needed to complete the survey” (Granello 
& Wheaton, 2004, p. 389).  The use of the internet as data conduit could have 
systematically affected the sample; however, the sample of interest seemingly had access 
to the internet and was comfortable using the internet as they provided an email address.  
Further, response rates can be harder to determine with an internet sample if access to the 
survey is unlimited in the number of individuals who can access the survey.  This 
difficulty can be ameliorated by the use of a “targeted group” and “a specific URL” 
(Granello & Wheaton, p. 390).  Thus, for the current study, the numbers of participants 
who were contacted and who responded were tracked.  Although internet surveys are 
relatively new, they have been shown to have greater generalizability and have similar 
conclusions to laboratory studies (Barchard & Williams, 2008).  
Implications 
 Testamentary capacity has not been the subject of much empirical research.  The 
results from the current study can inform the evolving area of defining the functional 
abilities within the area of testamentary competence.  While there is no national legal 
standard on testamentary competence, state statute has controlled this area, and across 
jurisdictions states consider similar elements.  However, prior to this study, there was not 
an evident consensus about the functional demands necessary for sufficient competency 
to make a will.  Assuming the results of the current study are generalizable to the general 
population of psychologists engaged in determinations of testamentary competence, it 
appears that four elements (understanding the nature of the will, understanding the nature 
and extent of property, knowing natural objects of one’s bounty, and understanding the 
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plan for distribution of assets) are seen by psychologists as essential in determining 
sufficiency of competence to make a will.  There results seem to indicate that these 
elements can be divided up into further capacities, which psychologists also found 
important in making a decision on testamentary competence.   
 The current study added to the testamentary competence literature in several 
important ways.  First, it is one of the few studies to attempt to define the functional 
capacities of competence to make a will.  Second, the survey used in the study was 
constructed using a conceptual model based on research from the legal and psychological 
literature.  Further, some of the factors were analogized from other legal competencies, 
such as competence to consent to treatment.  Third, the study tested a sample of 
individuals from a population of experts relevant to the competence of interest.  Finally, 
the findings have import for prospective assessments of testamentary competence in the 
future. 
 While retrospective assessment of testamentary competence is the most common 
way of determining competence (Regan & Gordon, 1997), present-state or prospective 
evaluation can often provide superior evidence (Champine, 2006).  Present-state 
evaluation adds a facet lost in retrospective assessment, the testator.  The testator would 
be available for interview, and the functional demands can be observed and tested rather 
than reconstructed, as they are in a retrospective assessment.  However, there is currently 
no forensic assessment instrument that is available to help inform clinicians’ decisions 
about testamentary competence.  This study’s attempt to understand these functional 
abilities presents a first step in the development of such a tool.  In the current study, the 
sample of psychologists reported that all four factors were important, even though the 
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majority of those surveyed did not indicate that they knew their states’ regulations 
surrounding testamentary capacity.  The identification of these four factors is an 
important step in developing specialized tools.  The development of a forensic 
assessment instrument specific to testamentary competence can inform legal policy and 
practice.  Behavioral scientists develop tools to inform and guide decision-makers in the 
legal system.  Probate judges would be the decision-makers in will contests, and a 
forensic assessment instrument would provide information to judges as they make their 
ultimate decision on whether a testator is competent.  In the next section, future research 
undertaking the development of this tool will be discussed.  As the population in the 
United States continues to age, the issue of testamentary competence will be increasingly 
raised.   
Future Research 
 The results of this study could be used in various ways.  First, a number of 
variables derived from the psycholegal literature were tested.  Many of the variables were 
identified by psychologists as being important or extremely important in assessing a 
testator’s capacities to make a will and being significantly greater than midpoint of scale.  
Prior to the current study, these variables had not been empirically tested, and replication 
is necessary.  The findings that these 19 variables are important is likely due to a real, 
non-chance effect; however, to bolster this finding replication would help to see if there 
are other factors other than the independent variables that are operating.  Further, Kazdin 
(2003) notes that “replications early in the development of an area of research are 
particularly important as the bedrock of theory and empirical phenomena are established” 
(p. 494).   
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Second, future research could focus on the next steps in developing a forensic 
assessment instrument for use in cases concerning testamentary capacity.  Developing a 
well constructed forensic assessment involves a number of steps.  The current study 
undertook the first steps: identification of the legal question and the relevant forensic 
capacities and operationalization of the variables to be measured (including the forensic 
capacities) (Heilbrun, Rogers, & Otto, 2002).  There are a number of remaining steps, 
including piloting of the instrument to obtain information on its practicality and 
psychometric properties, full derivation study to clarify information obtained during the 
piloting step, cross-validation to provide independent information on the instrument, and 
the development of a manual describing the steps taken, research conducted, and 
addressing questions of administration and interpretation (Heilbrun, Rogers, & Otto).  
However, before those latter steps can be taken, it would be wise to replicate the work 
done in the study and add other populations whose knowledge would be relevant to 
competence to make will.  This would include exploring the opinions of not only mental 
health professionals but also the opinions of legal professionals, such as trusts and estate 
lawyers and probate judges, or a combination of legal and mental health professionals.  
There was an idiosyncratic finding in the conceptualization of forensic experience 
which led to differing and opposite effects in the results.  Future research may be able 
focus on and develop further the idea of subgroups of forensic experience and how 
various subgroups rate sufficiency of competence to make a will.  While this was an 
interesting finding in the current study, replication and further study would be necessary 
to see if this is a viable avenue for future research.   
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Finally, future research can focus on using a longer vignette that may better 
approximate the breadth of materials received and used by psychologists to make 
determinations of testamentary competence.  The current vignette was one page, and 
future studies might want to expand upon the vignette providing more information to the 
participants.  Even though it can be argued that some individuals would not response to a 
lengthy survey, some may be willing to consider additional information.  Further 
information that could be provided to participants could include variables related to 
cognitive deficits, and a study focusing on the effect of cognitive deficits on testamentary 
capacity would be another avenue for future research. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Participants by Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
State N 
 
Alabama 
 
4 
Alaska 1 
Arizona 6 
Arkansas 1 
California 42 
Colorado 3 
Connecticut 3 
Delaware 0 
District of Columbia 1 
Florida 21 
Georgia 13 
Hawaii 3 
Idaho 1 
Illinois 12 
Indiana 2 
Iowa 3 
Kansas 3 
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Kentucky  3 
Louisiana 0 
Maine 5 
Maryland 7 
Massachusetts 20 
Michigan 8 
Minnesota 6 
Mississippi 0 
Missouri 6 
Montana 1 
Nebraska 1 
Nevada 4 
New Hampshire 4 
New Jersey 6 
New Mexico 2 
New York  26 
North Carolina 14 
North Dakota 0 
Ohio 14 
Oklahoma 3 
Oregon 3 
Pennsylvania 14 
Rhode Island 1 
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South Carolina 0 
South Dakota 1 
Tennessee 4 
Texas 20 
Utah 0 
Vermont 1 
Virginia 8 
Washington 7 
West Virginia 2 
Wisconsin 9 
Wyoming 2 
Puerto Rico 3 
Canada 5 
Do not practice 11 
Missing 3 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance for Ratings of Sufficiency of Competence to Make a Will 
Source df  F Partial η2 p 
 
Transfers property (TP) 
 
1 
 
6.066 
 
.019 
 
.014* 
Important assets (IA) 1 31.466 .091 .001** 
Heirs & Relationship (HR) 1 80.053 .203 .001** 
Non-delusional rationale (NDR) 1 11.508 .035 .001** 
TP X IA 1 7.148 .022 .008** 
TP X HR 1 .003 .000 .960 
TP X NDR 1 3.167 .010 .076 
IA X HR 1 .389 .001 .534 
IA X NDR 1 .875 .003 .350 
HR X NDR 1 .855 .003 .356 
TP X IA X HR 1 .016 .000 .900 
TP X IA X NDR 1 .001 .000 .978 
TP X HR X NDR 1 .001 .000 .970 
IA X HR X NDR 1 1.953 .006 .163 
TR X IA X HR X NDR 1 4.547 .014 .034* 
error 315 (.620)   
Note: Values enclosed in parenthesis represent mean square errors. 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
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Table 3  
Multiple Regression Analysis for Variable Predicting Sufficiency of Competence to Make 
a Will 
 
Variable B SE B β 
 
Gender 
 
.163 
 
.116 
 
.088 
Years of Practice .020 .006 .239* 
Number of Forensic Evaluations in Past 
Year 
.002 .001 .286* 
Number of Forensic Evaluations in Career .000 .000 -.245* 
Number of Competence to Make Will  
Evaluations in Past Year 
-.038 .034 -.093 
Number of Competence to Make Will 
Evaluations in Career 
.000 .003 -.005 
Familiarity with State Will Regulations  .089 .121 .048 
Race -.016 .181 -.005 
Urban v. Not -.131 .166 -.071 
Suburban v. Not -.078 .178 -.039 
Note: R2 = .076 (p < .01) 
*p < .01 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix of Ratings of Factors Important in Determining Capacity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 1.0                     
2 .207** 1.0                    
3 .082 .177* 1.0                   
4 .140* .372** .263** 1.0                  
5 .006 .086 .007 -.050 1.0                 
6 .077 .097 .165** .159** .124* 1.0                
7 .151** .144** .059 .111* .183** .651** 1.0               
8 .187** .176** .120* .161** .310** .256** .332** 1.0              
9 .139* .118* .086 .048 .160** .196** .197** .250** 1.0             
10 .165** .140* .104 .135* .089 .157** .216** .258** .584** 1.0            
11 .233** .171** .086 .119* .159** .088 .140* .253** .405** .326** 1.0           
12 .106 .228** .108* .357** .063 .134* .190** .187** .133* .215** .315** 1.0          
13 .148** .173** .085 .159** .231** .298** .288** .232** .247** .351** .277** .335** 1.0         
14 .117* .141* .089 .160** .266** .136* .195** .347** .418** .381** .435** .315** .479** 1.0        
15 .013 .047 .126* .136* .146** .239** .284** .175** .148** .210** .152** .243** .338** .316** 1.0       
16 .061 .124* .096 .057 .183** .251** .331** .211** 165** .173** .143** .230** .320** .295** .435** 1.0      
17 .115* .181** .039 .045 .270** .285** .333** .357** .227** .229** .307** .193** .330** .492** .309** .365** 1.0     
18 .183** .212** .106 .017 313** .220** .267** .294** .258** .256** .366** .185** .274** .496** .224** .247** .653** 1.0    
19 -.001 .185** .041 .157** .172** .287** .303** .266** .203** .240** .104 .242** .307** .196** .310** .243** .247** .155** 1.0   
20 .110* .081 .064 .077 .214** .157** .190** .246** .203** .258** .255** .133* .347** .378** .212** .315** .514** .456** .219** 1.0  
21 .160** .150** .050 .055 .173** .145** .208** .237** .192** .228** .238** .052 .154** .279** .140* .042 .282** .282** .150** .123* 1.0 
** Correlation sig. at 0.01 level (2-tailed), * Correlation sig. at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
1 = Whether testator knows that he will die 
2 = Whether testator knows that the will is a written document 
3 = Whether testator knows that the will transfers property to his or her heirs 
4 = Whether testator knows that the will takes effect after death 
5 = Whether testator can express his or her understanding verbally 
6 = Whether testator knows what important assets s/he owns 
7 = Whether testator knows the financial value of his or her assets 
8 = Whether testator knows the sentimental value of his or her assets 
9 = Whether testator knows his or her immediate family members 
10 = Whether testator knows whether his or her heirs are dead or alive 
11 = Whether testator knows difference between family, significance others, and close 
friends versus others 
12 = Whether testator understands that s/he is free to disinherit his or her heirs  
13 = Whether testator is able to name heirs  
14 = Whether testator is able to detail his or her relationship with his or her heirs 
15 = Whether testator can articulate some basic plan for distribution of property 
16 =Whether testator can articulate the consequences of his or her will 
17 = Whether testator can explain his or her rationale of distribution 
18 = Whether testator can justify if certain individuals are excluded from the will 
19 = Whether testator knows who the executor (appointed representative) of the will is 
20 = Whether testator’s rationale for distribution is based in reality 
21 = The size of the estate 
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Table 5 
Single Sample t-test Ratings of Importance in Determining Competence to Make a Will 
 
Source Mean df t d p 
 
Knows that s/he will die 
 
3.25 
 
329 
 
3.570 
 
.20 
 
.001* 
Knows that will is written 
document 
 
4.09 330 22.856 1.25 .001* 
Knows that will transfers property 
to heirs 
 
4.65 330 48.079 2.64 .001* 
Knows that will takes effect after 
death 
 
4.57 331 44.706 2.45 .001* 
Can express his or her 
understanding verbally 
 
3.87 330 13.785 .76 .001* 
Knows what important assets s/he 
owns 
 
4.35 329 36.999 2.04 .001* 
Knows financial values of his or 
her assets 
 
3.96 331 23.207 1.27 .001* 
Knows sentimental value of his or 
her assets 
3.08 330 
 
1.340 ----- .181 
Knows his or her immediate 
family members 
4.31 331 
 
25.817 1.42 .001* 
Knows whether his or her heirs 
are dead or alive 
4.44 330 
 
33.484 1.84 .001* 
Knows difference between family, 
significant others, and close 
friends versus others 
4.11 330 
 
23.292 1.28 .001* 
Understands s/he is free to 
disinherit his or her heirs 
 
4.39 330 37.865 2.08 .001* 
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Able to name heirs 4.18 330 26.647 1.46 .001* 
Able to detail relationship with 
heirs 
 
3.83 331 16.474 .90 .001* 
Can articulate some basic plan for 
distribution 
 
4.15 330 27.119 1.49 .001* 
Can articulate consequences of 
the will 
 
4.19 331 24.925 1.37 .001* 
Can explain rationale for 
distribution 
 
3.70 331 12.935 .71 .001* 
Can justify if certain individuals 
are excluded 
 
3.37 329 5.919 .33 .001* 
Knows who executor (appointed 
representative) of the will is 
 
4.02 330 19.431 1.07 .001* 
Rationale for distribution is based 
in reality 
 
4.28 330 25.352 1.39 .001* 
Size of the estate 2.46 330 -8.361 -.46 .001** 
*Significantly higher than midpoint of scale, p < .001 
**Significantly lower than the midpoint of scale, p < .001 
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Figure 1- Interaction among Knowing Will Transfers Property, Knowing Important 
Assets Owned, Being Able to Name Heirs and Detail Relationship, and Being Able to 
Explain a Non-delusional Rationale 
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Figure 2 – Interaction between Knowing Will Transfers Property and Knowing Important 
Assets Owned 
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Figure 3 – Scatterplot of Multiple Regression 
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Figure 4 – Histogram of Multiple Regression 
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Appendix A: Email Communication to Psychologists from the American 
Psychological Association 
 
 
 
Initial Email Communication to Psychologists  
 
Dear Psychological Professional:  
 
I am a graduate student in the Law and Psychology Program at Drexel University 
conducting a doctoral dissertation in the area of competence to make a will.  As part of 
this study, I am seeking responses from psychologists with interests in aging or forensic 
psychology. 
 
The present survey has been carefully piloted and takes no more than 10 minutes but 
closer to 5 minutes for most people.  It is fully anonymous and can be accessed through 
the following link:  
 
http://www.surveymethods.com/EndUser.aspx? 
 
If you interested in receiving a summary of the results of this study, you can request this 
at the end of the survey.  Thank you for considering participation in this important area in 
which little empirical research is now available. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Christina M. Finello 
Ph.D. Degree Candidate 
cmf29@drexel.edu 
 
Two Week Follow-up Email Communication to Psychologists  
 
Dear Psychological Professional:  
 
This email is a follow up to a request for survey participation for my doctoral dissertation 
that was sent to you on November 21, 2008.  If you have already completed the survey, 
please accept my thanks and let me know if you would like a summary of the results. 
 
If you have not completed the survey, please consider this last request to participate (I 
won’t bother you further).  If you would like to participate, you may do so by clicking on 
the following link: http://www.surveymethods.com/EndUser.aspx? 
 
Sincerely, 
Christina M. Finello 
Ph.D. Degree Candidate 
cmf29@drexel.edu 
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Appendix B: Vignettes 
 
 
 
Please read the following facts, and then answer the question that follows: 
 
A 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, that while living with her daughter’s 
family, she had been required to do things which she did not want to do, that her 
daughter’s husband made a derogatory remark regarding Ms. A’s ethnicity, and that her 
daughter’s family was lacking in religious spirit.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had 
failed to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate 
representation of their worth. 
B 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter and that her daughter had tried to kill 
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Ms. A by putting glass in her pudding.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed to 
contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Independent evidence 
discloses that her daughter had prepared the pudding with the glass in it, but the glass was 
there accidentally.  Furthermore, Ms. A had been assured by many people that such was 
the case, but she persisted in believing that her daughter wanted to harm her.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate 
representation of their worth. 
C 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told you that 
she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the Children 
Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable 
savings account.  Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate 
representation of their worth. 
D 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
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During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that God sent her a message 
over the radio telling her to leave all of her money to the Save the Children Foundation.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save 
the Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate 
representation of their worth. 
E 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, that while living with her daughter’s 
family, she had been required to do things which she did not want to do, that her 
daughter’s husband made a derogatory remark regarding Ms. A’s ethnicity, and that her 
daughter’s family was lacking in religious spirit.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had 
failed to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she 
“must have about $10,000 or so.” 
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F 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter and that her daughter had tried to kill 
Ms. A by putting glass in her pudding.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed to 
contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Independent evidence 
discloses that her daughter had prepared the pudding with the glass in it, but the glass was 
there accidentally.  Furthermore, Ms. A had been assured by many people that such was 
the case, but she persisted in believing that her daughter wanted to harm her.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she 
“must have about $10,000 or so.” 
G 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that God sent her a message 
over the radio telling her to leave all of her money to the Save the Children Foundation.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save 
                                                                                         Testamentary Competence 91   
the Children Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a 
sizable savings account.  When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she 
“must have about $10,000 or so.” 
H 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told you that 
she wants to write a will so that she can give her property to the Save the Children 
Foundation.  Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable 
savings account.  When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she “must have 
about $10,000 or so.” 
I 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, that while living with her daughter’s 
family, she had been required to do things which she did not want to do, that her 
daughter’s husband made a derogatory remark regarding Ms. A’s ethnicity, and that her 
daughter’s family was lacking in religious spirit.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had 
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failed to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to make sure 
the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she expects her 
will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  Her estate is 
comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  Ms. A 
provided you with a list of those items and an accurate representation of their worth. 
J 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, and that her daughter had tried to 
kill Ms. A by putting glass in her pudding.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Independent 
evidence discloses that her daughter had prepared the pudding with the glass in it, but the 
glass was there accidentally.  Furthermore, Ms. A had been assured by many people that 
such was the case, but she persisted in believing that her daughter wanted to harm her.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to 
make sure the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she 
expects her will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  
Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  
Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate representation of their 
worth. 
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K 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told you that 
she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to make sure the Save 
the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she expects her will to do, 
she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies. Her estate is comprised 
of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  Ms. A provided you with 
a list of those items and an accurate representation of their worth. 
L 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, that while living with her daughter’s 
family, she had been required to do things which she did not want to do, that her 
daughter’s husband made a derogatory remark regarding Ms. A’s ethnicity, and that her 
daughter’s family was lacking in religious spirit.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had 
failed to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told 
you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to make sure 
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the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she expects her 
will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  Her estate is 
comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  When asked 
the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she “must have about $10,000 or so.” 
M 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that God sent her a message 
over the radio telling her to leave all of her money to the Save the Children Foundation.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to 
make sure the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she 
expects her will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  
Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  
Ms. A provided you with a list of those items and an accurate representation of their 
worth. 
N 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave only one dollar of a sizable 
estate to her daughter and the rest to the Save the Children Foundation.  She explained 
that she had not gotten along well with her daughter, and that her daughter had tried to 
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kill Ms. A by putting glass in her pudding.  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Independent 
evidence discloses that her daughter had prepared the pudding with the glass in it, but the 
glass was there accidentally.  Furthermore, Ms. A had been assured by many people that 
such was the case, but she persisted in believing that her daughter wanted to harm her.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to 
make sure the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she 
expects her will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  
Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  
When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she “must have about $10,000 or 
so.” 
O 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that she (Ms. A) had failed 
to contribute enough in support of the Save the Children Foundation.  Ms. A told you that 
she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to make sure the Save 
the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she expects her will to do, 
she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies. Her estate is comprised 
of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  When asked the value of 
her estate, Ms. A reported that she “must have about $10,000 or so.” 
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P 
Ms. A’s lawyer has requested and you agreed to evaluate Ms. A for her competence to 
make a will.  Ms. A is 80-years-old and has one child, a daughter who is 50-years-old.  
During the evaluation, you learn that Ms. A plans to leave her entire estate to the Save the 
Children Foundation.  When asked whether she has any heirs, she explained that “the 
nice people at the home take care of me.”  Ms. A also stated that God sent her a message 
over the radio telling her to leave all of her money to the Save the Children Foundation.  
Ms. A told you that she wants to write a will and asks you if you can also find a way to 
make sure the Save the Children Foundation gets her property.  When asked what she 
expects her will to do, she stated that she wants to make sure she is okay after she dies.  
Her estate is comprised of a house, a car, stocks, bonds, and a sizable savings account.  
When asked the value of her estate, Ms. A reported that she “must have about $10,000 or 
so.” 
 
After each version of the Vignette, the following question will be asked.  In this case, 
how sufficient would you rate Ms. A’s capacities to make a will? (please select one) 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 Entirely       Largely        Mixed    Largely    Entirely   
 Insufficient Insufficient     Evidence    Sufficient    Sufficient   
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire 
 
 
 
How important do you consider each of the following in assessing someone’s capacities  
 
to make a will?  (The “testator” is the person making the will.) 
 
1) Whether the testator knows that he will die. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
2) Whether the testator knows that the will is a written document. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
3) Whether the testator knows that the will transfers property to his or her heirs. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
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4) Whether the testator knows that the will takes effect after death. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
5) Whether the testator can express his or her understanding verbally. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
6) Whether the testator knows what important assets s/he owns. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
7) Whether the testator knows the financial values of his or her assets. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
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8) Whether the testator knows the sentimental value of his or her assets. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
9) Whether the testator knows his immediate family members. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
10) Whether the testator knows whether his or her heirs are dead or alive. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
11) Whether the testator knows the difference between family, significant others, and 
close friends versus others. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
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12) Whether the testator understands that s/he is free to disinherit his or her heirs. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
13) Whether the testator is able to name heirs. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
14) Whether the testator is able to detail his or her relationship with his or her heirs.  
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important  
15) Whether the testator can articulate some basic plan for distribution of property. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
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16) Whether the testator can articulate the consequences of his or her will. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
17) Whether the testator can explain his or her rationale of distribution. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
18) Whether the testator can justify if certain individuals are excluded from the will. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
19) Whether the testator knows who the executor (appointed representative) of the will is. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important  
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20) Whether the testator’s rationale for distribution is based in reality. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
21) The size of the estate. 
1  2   3   4  5 
Extremely  Unimportant  Between  Important Extremely  
Unimportant    Unimportant &   Important 
     Important 
                                                                                         Testamentary Competence 103  
Appendix D: Demographic Survey 
 
 
 
1.  Your Gender: ___male ___female 
2. Your Race/Ethnicity: 
___African American (non-Hispanic) ___Hispanic or Latino 
___White (non-Hispanic)   ___ Asian-American 
___American Indian or Alaskan Native ___Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander 
___Other (please specify):____________ 
3. In what state do you practice? _____________________ 
4. In what year did you obtain your doctoral degree?______ 
5. Please estimate how many forensic psychological evaluations (any type) have you 
conducted in the past year.________ 
6. Please estimate how many forensic psychological evaluations (any type) have you 
conducted in your career.__________ 
7. How many forensic psychological evaluations of competence to make a will have you 
conducted in the past year?  __________ 
8. How many forensic psychological evaluations of competence to make a will have you 
conducted in your career?  __________ 
9. Are you familiar with your state’s legal requirements for competence to make a will? 
  1   2 
  Yes   No 
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10. In what type of location do you work? 
1   2   3 
Urban   Suburban  Rural 
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